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ĉeMarket for 'Rough Diamonds': Information, Finance and
Wage Inequality in Macroeconomics
AĶňŉŇĵķŉ
During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased
signiėcantly in the US. ĉree of the most well-documented facts concern the increase
in the education premium, the rise in the experience premium and the narrowing gen-
der wage gap. Existing studies explain some of them separately but there is no uniėed
explanation of all three at the same time.
I provide a microfounded justiėcation for the ėrst two, by introducing private em-
ployer learning in a signaling model with credit constraints. I show that when ėnancial
constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated
pool. ĉis implies that the eventual group of uneducated young workers becomes of
lower average quality, as most of the rough diamonds have now been plucked out of this
group. My explanation is consistent with US data from 1970's to 2000's, indicating that
the rise in the education and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-
inexperiencedwages, while at the same time skilled or experiencedwages do not change
much. ĉemodel accounts also for the fact that the education premium increases more
for low-experienced workers, while the experience premium increases only for the low-
educated ones.
ĉe introduction of gender-speciėc credit constraints, explains also the narrowing
gender wage gap, by allowing the cost of borrowing to decline and becomemore similar
for the two genders recently, while in the past it was much costlier for women. More
equal borrowing opportunities for men and women, decrease inequality between gen-
ders, however they also increase inequality within gender by boosting the wage gap be-
tween diﬀerent education and experience groups for both sexes.
ĉis theory explains the puzzling coexistence of increasing meritocracy and growing
wage inequality in the American society, by highlighting the conĚict between equal op-
portunities and substantial economic equality.
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''To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is
the principal problem in Political Economy''.
David Ricardo,
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817).
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Introduction
TļĹ BĵňĽķ EķŃłŃŁĽķ PŇŃĶŀĹŁ concerns ''the allocation of scarce resources'' or
the fact that individuals have limited means to satisfy unlimited needs. In particu-
lar, over the past half century the increasing contribution of human capital to eco-
nomic growth has brought the allocation of human resources and its reward struc-
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ture back to the core of economics. ĉat is why the issue of distribution remains
fundamental in understanding the functioning of society.
ĉe examination of labor income distribution appears to have both a general
and an economic value. ĉe societal consequences of wage inequality are various
and crucial but yet far from well-understood. Both ethical and eﬃciency-related
considerations has kept the issue of income distribution at the center of political
debates and amajor concern for individuals and policymakers throughout the his-
tory of human civilization. ĉe economic value of wage inequality relates both to
methodological ways of approaching the issue and its relationship with other key
variables, such as economic growth. Wage inequality has been examined across
the entire spectrum of economic science, from economic theory to econometrics,
frommacroeconomics to appliedmicroeconomics, from development to political
economics, as well as from organizational economics to international trade. How-
ever, existing studies are still inconclusive on which is the appropriate methodol-
ogy to examine income distribution and how it interacts with other variables of
interest.
Additionally, over the past few decades it seems that economic sciences have
shiěed away from the typical micro-macro separation to a more meaningful dis-
tinction between applied and theoretical economics. However, recent develop-
ments in applied theory, structural econometrics and behavioral economics at-
tempt to bridge the gap between theory and empirical work, too. Furthermore,
despite the signiėcant progress on themeasurement ofwell-being using alternative
indexes, I feel that the level of income and its distribution still remain two of the
2
main indicators of welfare inmodern societies. ĉat is why I feel that the examina-
tion of wage inequality apart frombeing an issue of both societal and economic in-
terest, can also be proved helpful in building a uniėed economic framework, away
from the conventional ''micro-macro'' and ''applied-theory'' dichotomies.
During the past four decades wage inequality increased signiėcantly in many
developed countries and especially in the US.ĉree of themost well-documented
inequality facts concern the increase in the educationwagepremium, the rise in the
experience premium and the narrowing gender wage gap. Macroeconomists and
labor economists highlight that this paĨern has been observed in most advanced
economies¹. However, we still lack a rigorous understanding of the causes and
consequences of these rising labor market inequalities. Existing studies have pro-
vided explanations only for some of these paĨerns separately. My research agenda
aĨempts to ėll this gap in the literature by providing a uniėed explanation for the
combination of these changes in the wage structure related to education, experi-
ence and gender, as well as for their interaction. In doing so, I ėrst examine sys-
tematically the evidence from the labormarket, then I buildmicrofoundedmodels
and ultimately I test empirically the predictions of my theoretical results. I am pri-
marily interested in the policy implications of my analysis, that is why I consider
crucial the use of realistic theory that explains empirical evidence.
ĉere is a dense literature on technology-skill complementarities that explains
the rise in the education premium (skill premium). However, the rising experi-
ence premium remains an understudied aspect of increasing inequality. ĉis study
¹See for instance the cross-country study by Krueger et al. (2010).
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introducesprivate employer learning in amodel of signalingwith credit constraints
to provide a microfounded justiėcation for the increase in both the education and
the experience premium, as well as for their interaction. My theory suggests that
asymmetric information and credit constraints do not allow ėrms to distinguish
the poor but able individuals from the less-able ones, resulting initially in a pooled
wage for all uneducated workers. However, with working experience ėrms pri-
vately accumulate performance observations and learn the type of their ownwork-
ers. Private learning implies that incumbent employers have superior information
about the type of their own employees compared to potential competitors. ĉis
allows ėrms to derive an information rent by sorting their workersmore eﬃciently,
which consequently leads todiﬀerentwagepaths for uneducatedworkers, depend-
ing on their revealed ability-type. Notice that when ėrms learn the type of their
uneducated workers, it is already too late for the high-ability ones to acquire ed-
ucation and receive the full return of their investment in schooling, as they are
already old. ĉis keeps these rough diamonds - highly able but poor individuals -
trapped to work for lower wages than their marginal productivity.
Importantly, when ėnancial frictions become less binding, a larger fraction of
the talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducatedpool. ĉis
means that aěer the relaxation of credit constraints, individuals of the same ability
receive lower wages, as the composition of the uneducated group changes and on
average is comprised of less able workers. ĉis decreases unskilled-inexperienced
wages and increases wage inequality. My explanation is consistent with US data
from1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise in the skill and the experience premium
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coincides with the fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time
skilled or experienced wages do not change much.
ĉemodel accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the grow-
ing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising wage inequality related
to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill pre-
mium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced
ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of the increasing experience premium within
the group of unskilled workers and its Ěat paĨern among the skilled ones.
My theoretical predictions hold under various robustness checks and provide
some interesting policy implications about the potential conĚict between inequal-
ity of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of min-
imum wage policy in determining the level of equilibrium wage inequality. I also
calibrate the model using a more realistic production function with diminishing
returns to incorporate my theory to the skill-biased technical change approach.
I extend thismodel to examine how the increase in female college participation,
has boosted both the experience and the skill premium, while at the same time it
has narrowed the gender wage gap. ĉe new feature of this model is that credit
constraints are gender-speciėc, as they are more binding for women. My approach
suggests that in the past access to credit was much costlier for women compared
to men, while recently the cost of borrowing has becomemore similar for the two
genders. An implication of this model is that most of the rough diamonds, who
could not get education in the past, were talented but credit constrained women.
When credit constraints relax more for women, many talented females can get an
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education and the composition of uneducated youngworkers changes, as it is now
comprisedofworkerswith lower averagequality. ĉis theorynot only is consistent
with the narrowing inequality between genders and the growing inequality within
gender, but it also shows that this happens precisely because the education and the
experience premium increase sharply.
Overall, my doctoral research provides some new results related to the func-
tioning of ėnancial markets, educational opportunities and economic inequality.
My analysis provides an explanation based on labor supply and in this sense it can
be viewed as complementary to demand theories based on the skill-biased tech-
nical change. I show that even when opportunities become more equal, for in-
stance through extended student loans ormore similar college aĨendance formen
and women, economic inequality can in fact increase. ĉese unintended conse-
quences suggest that economists and policy makers should examine carefully the
possibility of adopting complementary policies to cushion such side-eﬀects.
I strongly feel that there is a promising avenue for both theoretical and empirical
researchon the relationship between labormarket inequalities andmarket failures,
such as ėnancial frictions and incomplete information. ĉis thesis just initiates an
academic research agenda that I am planning to continue over the years to come.
By doing so, I hope to contribute to understanding beĨer some of the perplexing
paĨerns of inequality, it causes and consequences.
Chapter 2 documents the changes in the US wage structure over the past ėve
decades andplaces this thesis to the existing literature. Chapters 3 develops the ba-
sic framework, focusing mainly on education and experience. Chapters 4 extends
6
the analysis with the inclusion of gender considerations. Chapter 5 highlights the
main policy implication of this study and concludes.
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''ĉe worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal
things equal''.
Aristotle,
384 BC - 322 BC.y
2
USWage Inequality &Market Failures
Abstract: Since the 1970's, countries like the US have experienced the puzzling co-
existence ofmore equal opportunitywith higherwage inequality. Even though the sharp
increase in wage inequality is well-known, its perplexing paĨerns are still far from being
adequately understood. In particular, for workers with low education, job experience
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accounts for a rising amount of pay disparities. Similarly, for inexperienced workers, ed-
ucation plays an increasingly important role in determiningwagediscrepancies. Existing
studies cannot explain these trends, as their emphatic focus on education and technol-
ogy has diverted aĨention from other vital developments, such as the impact of working
experience, the role of asymmetric information and the inĚuence of ėnancial frictions.
2.1 IłŉŇŃĸŊķŉĽŃł
TļĹ SļĵŇń IłķŇĹĵňĹ Ľł US WĵĻĹ IłĹŅŊĵŀĽŉŏ seems to be a point of agree-
ment among social scientists and policy makers. However, we still lack a rigorous
understandingof its causes and consequences. Several studies, using awide variety
of data sources and indexes, suggest that aěer a long period of stability, economic
inequality has grown signiėcantly since 1970's. Some paĨerns of increasing wage
inequality, such as the rise in the education premium, are well-documented in the
literature. However, some other aspects of widening inequality, such as the grow-
ing experience wage premium, are less well-reported, if not entirely absent from
most existing studies. ĉe rising inequality has coincided with the advancement
of the American economy that oﬀeredmore opportunities to historically less priv-
ileged groups. ĉese opportunities relate to various dimensions of social life, from
acquiring education to starting a business. Unambiguously, the improved func-
yĉis statement has been aĨributed to Aristotle when it ėrst appeared in an explanation of
Aristotle's politics in Time magazine in 1974, before being condensed to an epigram as ''Aris-
totle's Axiom'' in Peter (1979). However, it has been oěen disputed or claimed to have been
misaĨributed to him.
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tioning of markets over that period played an important role in generating more
opportunities but also in boosting wage inequality.
As far as education is concerned, during the past forty years the average level
of schooling increased sharply in the US, while wage inequality between diﬀerent
education groups has grown too. Most of the existing papers focus on technol-
ogy to provide an explanation for the increasing educationwage premium, despite
the rising supply of educated workers.¹ In spite of its success and importance in
understanding the eﬀects of technical change on inequality, this approach fails to
explain the consistently rising wage gap between groups with diﬀerent levels of la-
bor market experience, as well as the evolution of wage inequality within diﬀerent
education and experience groups.²
ĉis paper explores the importance of market failures, such as ėnancial con-
straints and asymmetric information, in providing an explanation for several wage
inequality facts. Using US data, I examine systematically the evidence on the evo-
lution of wage inequality, both between diﬀerent education or experience groups
andwithin eachof these groups. ĉen, I develop amicrofounded theoreticalmodel
that is consistent with the combination of these stylized facts of increasing wage
inequality. Ultimately, I test empirically themost important predictions ofmy the-
oretical explanation. I alsobuild auniėed framework to comparemymodel of sort-
ing to the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) approach. ĉe combination of the
¹Katz and Murphy (1992) is one of the earliest contributions on this branch of literature,
while Acemoglu (2002), Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) review the
literature on technology-skill complementarities.
²One of the ėrst papers to criticize the technical change explanation is Card and DiNardo
(2002a).
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two theories is feasible, as mymodel focuses on labor supply and in this sense it is
complementary to the SBTC, which emphasizes demand factors. ĉe two theo-
ries together seem to provide a beĨer understanding of labor income distribution,
compared to each approach alone.
In particular, this study ėrst documents some stylized paĨerns of wage inequal-
ity in relation to: the education and the experience wage premium, the education
premium within diﬀerent experience groups and the experience premium within
diﬀerent education groups.³ Second, provides an explanation for these paĨerns
by introducing private employer learning in a model of education signaling with
credit constraints. My theory suggests that asymmetric information and credit
constraints do not allow ėrms to distinguish the poor but able individuals from
the less-able ones, resulting initially in a pooled wage for all uneducated workers.
However, withworking experience ėrms privately accumulate performance obser-
vations and learn the type of their own workers. Private learning implies that in-
cumbent employers are beĨer informed for the type of their own employees com-
pared to potential competitors. ĉis allows ėrms to derive an information rent by
sorting their workers more eﬃciently, which consequently leads to diﬀerent wage
paths for uneducated workers, depending on their revealed ability-type. Impor-
tantly, whenėnancial frictionsbecome less binding, a larger fractionof the talented
individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool. ĉis implies that
the eventual group of uneducated young workers becomes of lower average qual-
³ĉe terms education, college and skill premium are used interchangeably throughout this
paper to describe wage diﬀerentials between the relatively more and the relatively less educated
workers. In thenext section I provide a formal deėnitionof the skill and the experience premium.
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ity, as most of the ''rough diamonds'' have now been plucked out of this group. In
response, ėrms oﬀer lower wages to the remaining unskilled-inexperienced work-
ers, which ultimately boosts wage inequality.
ĉemodel explains: the increase in the skill premium despite the growing sup-
ply of skills; the increase in the experience premium as a result of private employer
learning; the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its
moderate expansion for the experienced ones; as well as, the puzzling coexistence
of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its
Ěat paĨern among the skilled ones. ĉese results also hold when the purely infor-
mational model with signaling and employer learning, extends with the inclusion
of returns to education due to human capital and returns to experience due to em-
ployee learning (learning-by-doing).
Oneof themost importantpredictionsof the theoreticalmodel is that unskilled-
inexperienced wages decline and this in turn boosts wage inequality. Using the
Current Population Survey, I ėnd that US data from 1970 to 1997 conėrm this
prediction, as they indicate that the rise in the skill and the experiencepremiumco-
incides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled
or experienced wages remain constant. My theory suggests that on average, abil-
ity for uneducated workers is lower aěer the relaxation of credit constraints. I test
empirically this hypothesis using theNational Longitudinal Surveys of Youth. ĉe
empirical analysis provides further support to my sorting hypothesis, by showing
that there is a robust decline on the ability of the average uneducated worker com-
pared to the past. At the same time I exclude other potential explanations by show-
12
ing that for the relatively more educated workers, there might also be a decline in
ability, however this decline over time is not always statistically signiėcant and it
is smaller in magnitude compared to the group of less educated workers.
2.2 TļĹMĽķŇŃĹķŃłŃŁĽķDĹĶĵŉĹ
ĉis paper contributes to a microeconomic debate on signaling and human capital,
related to the ėeld of the economics of information, which has grown rapidly since
the 1970's and has been applied to diﬀerent economic areas, including labor eco-
nomics. Within the studies that focus on the economics of information in labor
markets, this paper relates to three branches of the literature centering on signal-
ing, employer learning and credit constraints. In this sense it links to earlier studies
incorporating two of these; however, none of them builds on a uniėed framework
of all these elements.⁴ I strongly feel that it is crucial to include all three of them in
evaluating the eﬀects of education and experience on inequality in labor markets
with informational and ėnancial frictions.
Spence's (1973) seminal contribution centers on the idea that education serves
as a signaling device and conveys information related to worker's ability to unin-
formed ėrms. ĉat is why apart from the ''return to education due to human cap-
ital'', which captures Becker's (1964) idea that education increases productivity,
there is also a ''return to education due to signaling''.
However, employers can also derive information for the type of their workers
⁴Townsend (1979) was one of the ėrst to combine two of these, credit market imperfections
and information asymmetries in order to determine entrepreneur behavior and their contribu-
tion to aggregate output.
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through labor market experience. In this sense experience can also convey infor-
mation and can generate a return, the so called ''return to experience due to em-
ployer learning''. ĉe non-informational counterpart for experience is the ''return
to experience due to employee learning'' or learning-by-doing. So, for both educa-
tion and experience there exists an informational and a non-informational return.
Importantly, onemust also notice that employer learning itself can be asymmetric
in a dual way: ėrst, current employers learn more about their workers' type com-
pared to potential competitors, which I call ''employer learning asymmetric to the
ėrm''; second, a given employer learns more about a particular group of workers,
say high school graduates, compared to other workers, for instance college grad-
uates, which I call ''employer learning asymmetric to the worker''. Some of these
ideas have been developed separately both theoretically and empirically but tomy
knowledge no study has examined all these informational aspects of the labormar-
ket in a uniėed framework, yet.
Only few studies focus on asymmetric employer learning. Schönberg (2007)
supports that there is no evidence for asymmetric employer learning, apart from
the case of college graduates, while Kahn (2009) employs diﬀerent identiėcation
strategies and all cases favor asymmetric employer learning.⁵ In a recent study,
Arcidiacono et al. (2010) derive the important result that education principally
reveals ability, that is why ability is almost perfectly observed for college gradu-
⁵Galindo-Rueda (2003) ėnds that this learning process, especially among blue-collar work-
ers, favors incumbent employers relative to potential competitors (asymmetric employer learn-
ing). Pinkston (2009) employs a model of asymmetric employer learning to distinguish private
employer learning from public learning and employee learning. However, in practice it is not
easy to separate ėrm-speciėc learning-by-doing from employer learning.
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ates, while the same is not true for high school graduates. For the laĨer, ability is
gradually revealed with tenure and employer learning seems to be important only
for this group. ĉroughout this paper, I allow employer learning to be asymmetric,
in the sense that incumbent ėrms learnmore for their ownworkers' type compared
to potential competitors.
Returning to Spence's (1973) idea and the debate between the signaling and
the Beckerian (1964) human capital approach, one can review several studies at-
tempting to shedmore light on this issue.⁶ Lange (2007) supports that the signal-
ing value of education depends on the speed of employer learning. He ėnds that
employers learn quickly, since initial expectation errors decline by ƩƤ% within Ƨ
years. For this reason he argues that the signaling value of education is less than
ƦƩ%, which highlights the limited value of signaling.⁷ ĉis new empirical result
suggests that theoretical models of signaling should also examine the role of em-
ployer learning, which is precisely what my paper does.
Even though there is a richbodyof literature focusingon signaling andemployer
learning, noneof the existing studies examines howcredit constraints interactwith
these two elements and none compares how these ėnancial frictions aﬀect edu-
⁶Bedard (2001) examines credit constraints in eduction to ėnd that the signaling explanation
is empirically more plausible than the human capital one. However, using the minimum school
age Chevalier et al. (2004) ėnd that the human capital approach is more realistic. For an earlier
literature review on this debate see Weiss (1995).
⁷Kaymak's (2007) ėndings are on the same direction. Using OLS he estimates that the con-
tribution of signaling to wages is ƦƦ% of the return to education. For the higher ability workers,
the return to signaling is much smaller. Habermalz's (2006) paper discusses the claim made in
Altonji and Pierret (1996) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job
market signaling. He deems that if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer
learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.
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cation and employer learning.⁸ Farber and Gibbons (1996) develop a dynamic
model with employer learning about worker ability in a competitive labor mar-
ket. ĉey derive some novel results related to education and experience. Among
other, they conclude that even though the inĚuence of education declines as per-
formance observations accumulate, the estimated eﬀect of education on the level
of wages is independent of labor-market experience. ĉey also show that ability
measures unobserved by employers are increasingly correlated with wages as ex-
perience increases. Altonji (2005) argues that themarketmight delay to learn that
a worker is highly skilled if the worker's best early job opportunity is a low-skill-
level job that reveals liĨle about the worker's talent. Bauer and Haisken-DeNew
(2001) ėnd no evidence of employer learning apart from the case of blue-collar
workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. ĉis result, which is in line with
my paper, indicates that the absence of a college degree among unskilled workers
increases the inĚuence of employer learning on wages.
2.3 TļĹ PŃŀĽķŏ DĹĶĵŉĹ
Card (1999) highlights the consistently higher IV estimates for the eﬀect of edu-
cation on wages, compared to the standard OLS. He stresses that this diﬀerence
of 20-30% can be aĨributed to the existence of credit constraints. ĉis hypothesis
is also supported in an inĚuential paper by Ellwood and Kane (2000), who ėnd
that the strong correlation between family income and college aĨainment, reveals
the importance of credit constraints. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) provide an
⁸Jovanovic (1979) was one of the earliest contributions on employer learning.
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alternative view on this policy debate by showing that ėnancial constraints are not
important once you control for long-run constraints related to family background
and student ability. ĉey also question the validity of the instruments on educa-
tion in the existing literature and they conclude that at the most an 8% of the US
population is credit constrained.⁹
ĉesignaling approach I adopt in this study linksmorewithHendel et al. (2005),
which combines credit constraints as in Galor and Zeira (1993) with Spence's
(1973) model of job market signaling. ĉey derive the important result that any-
thing makes education more aﬀordable, such as less severe credit constraints or
lower tuition fees, increases the skill premium.¹⁰ However, their framework is not
appropriate for the study of the experience premium, as well as for within group
wage inequality. More importantly, theirmain ėnding that unskilledwages decline
and largely this accounts for the increase in the college premium, is not supported
by empirical evidence. However, once we break down the skill premium to diﬀer-
ent experience groups, it seems that the decline of unkilled-inexperiencedwages is
themain determinant of rising wage inequality from 1970's till 2000. In particular,
over the period 1970-1997 real unskilled wages declined only by 2.6%, while real
wages for unskilled-inexperienced workers have fallen by 15.7% (see ėgure 21).
To reconcile this fact with theory, apart from education I also analyze experience
by introducing private employer learning in their model. ĉis extension seems to
⁹Lochner and Monje-Naranjo (2011) focus on the diﬀerent sources of student ėnance, as
well as on the relationship between family income and schooling. ĉey also provide evidence on
the allocation of talent in diﬀerent educational groups. In Lochner and Monje-Naranjo (2012)
they survey the literature on credit constraints in education.
¹⁰An earlier paper by Stiglitz (1975) also shows that beĨer screening through education leads
to higher inequality.
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explain some of the most important but yet puzzling facts of wage inequality and
by doing so, it yields some realistic policy implications too.
2.4 TļĹMĵķŇŃĹķŃłŃŁĽķDĹĶĵŉĹ
ĉis thesis also contributes to a macroeocnomic debate related to technology and
wage inequality. Numerous country-speciėc empirical studies, suggest that the
contribution of education and experience on wages has increased since 1970's.
Katz and Murphy (1992) aĨribute this to SBTC, while Juhn et al. (1993) ėnd
that education and experience explain about a quarter to a third of wage varia-
tion.¹¹ Bergmanet al. (1998) provide international evidence for SBTC.Krueger et
al. (2010), extend these ėndings to a cross-country comparison and support that
two of the most important macroeconomic facts over the past three decades, are
the sharp growth on the experience premium for almost all countries and the het-
erogeneous paĨern of skill premium. ĉe third important fact is that the gender
wage gap fell virtually everywhere (I examine this in chapter 4). ĉey propose that
the direction and the size of the change in the skill premium diﬀers across coun-
tries - in fact it increases in Anglo-Saxon counties, while it does not change much
and it even declines in some continental European countries - however the signiė-
cant rise of the experience premiumwas uniform for their sample of countries and
¹¹Goldin and Katz (2007) support that during the period 1980-2005, in separate analyses
by sex, rising education explains 62% of the growth of hourly wage variance for men and 37%
for women. Similarly, Lemieux (2006a) ėnds that higher returns to post-secondary education
explain 55% of the rise of male log hourly wage variance from 1973-5 to 2003-5. Murphy and
Welch (1992), ėnd that a 60% of wage variance is between schooling level, and a 40% is across
experience within schooling level.
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consists a macroeconomic regularity that is ignored inmost of the existingmacro-
labor studies.
A recent paper by Lagakos et al. (2012) suggests that the experience premium
is ĚaĨer in poor compared to rich countries. In previous studies human capital
includes mainly education and accounts for less than half of the variation in cross-
country income diﬀerences. ĉeir development accounting analysis proposes that
human capital, which includes experience too, accounts for almost two thirds of
income variation across countries. However, they do not explain why the size of
the experience premium is so diﬀerent across countries. My paper focuses on how
the experience premium increases in the US over time. However, if we consider
that in several dimensions theUS in the 1960'swere similar to some less developed
countries nowadays, thenmy theoreticalmodel can alsoprovide anexplanation for
the diﬀerences in the experience premium across countries. ĉe goal of my study
is to ėll this gap in the macro-labor literature related to the experience premium
by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit con-
straints. Ultimately, I show that a large part of increasing wage inequality that in
the literature is aĨributed to SBTC, can be explained by a labor supply model of
sorting, in which experience and market failures play an integral role.
Additionally, the rise in residual wage inequality rekindled the scientiėc interest
on labor income distribution.¹² Within the vast literature on increasing inequali-
¹²Violante (2002) suggests an argument for the rise of residual wage inequality based on tech-
nological improvement that diﬀerentiates the quality of jobs even for workers of the same ability.
In contrast, Lemieux (2006b) oﬀers a line of reasoning against it, grounded on the quality of data
and challenges the SBTC approach of rising demand for skills.
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ties, most of the papers center on SBTC to explain the rise of the skill premium.¹³
However, the increase of the experience premium remains an understudied as-
pect of rising wage inequality. As Heathcote et al. (2010) put it ''in the literature,
the rise in the experience premium has received much less aĨention than the skill
premium''. Card and DiNardo (2002a), suggest that the evidence linking grow-
ing wage inequality to SBTC is surprisingly weak. Moreover, they conjecture that
the emphatic focus on technology has diverted aĨention away fromother interest-
ing developments in the wage structure that cannot be easily explained by SBTC.
ĉey conclude that technology might have been responsible for expanding wage
inequality during the 1970's; however, from early 1980's onwards other plausible
factors, such as the fall of realminimumwage, might have aĨributed to this paĨern
of increasing wage inequality.¹⁴;¹⁵ Even though several authors highlight this gap
in the literature, surprisingly enough only few studies focus on the increasing im-
portance of experience on widening wage inequality. ĉe existing studies on the
experience premium are based on the following arguments:
1. On-the-job training with SBTC: Heckman et al. (1998) ėnd that on-the-job train-
ing with SBTC justiėes the increase of the experience premium, as well as the
diﬀerence of the experience premium within educational groups. A distinguish-
ing feature of my paper is that I examine the evolution of this paĨern across time,
¹³For a review of this literature see Acemoglu (2002) and Hornstein et al. (2005), among
many others.
¹⁴For the eﬀect of minimum wages on US inequality over the past 30 years, see Autor et al.
(2010).
¹⁵Apart from technical change and minimum wages, the other sources of rising inequality
include trade liberalization, immigration and the decline of labor unions. My analysis does not
examine these channels. However, for literature reviews one can see Card et al. (2004), Card
(2009), and Harrison et al. (2011), respectively.
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while they focus on wage proėles for diﬀerent groups of workers.
2. General Purpose Technologies: Aghion et al. (2002) propose that the generality of
technological knowledge allows workers to accumulate skills and this augments
the experiencepremium. However, theydonot examine the experiencepremium
within diﬀerent educational groups.
3. Technology-Experience complementarity in adoption: Weinberg (2004) argues that
senior workers have the privilege to combine their accumulated experience with
technology and thehighdegreeof complementarity betweenexperience and tech-
nology ampliėes the experience premium. However, it seems empirically more
plausible young workers to adapt more easily to technological changes.
4. Vintage Human Capital: Hornstein et al. (2005) point out that the experience
premium can grow aěer a technological improvement if the loss of the vintage
speciėc human capital compared to the gain of the productivity improvement
embodied in physical capital is larger for young workers. Again, this paper does
not examine the experience premium within diﬀerent education groups.
5. Demographic change: Jeong et al. (2010) suggest that changes in the demographic
composition can elevate the experience premium if the production function al-
lows for complementarity between physical eﬀort and accumulated working ex-
perience.¹⁶ However, they cannot explainwhy the experience premiumrises only
within the group of unskilled workers, despite the fact that the supply of experi-
enced workers increases both within the skilled and the unskilled group.
¹⁶For the impact of the labor force growth, which generated by the increase in labor supply
when the baby-boom generation entered the labor market see Dooley and GoĨschalk (1984).
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All the abovementioned studies emphasize on the eﬀects of technology on the ex-
perience premium and wage dispersion. My study approaches labor market ex-
perience from a diﬀerent perspective, as it focuses mainly on informational and
ėnancial frictions.
ĉe most important theoretical explanations on SBTC, relate to directed tech-
nical change (Acemoglu (1998) and Kiley (1999)) and technological revolutions
(Caselli (1999)). Apart from SBTC some papers focus on the ability or the task
-bias of technology.¹⁷ Among the studies focusing on technology, the most rel-
evant to my paper is the inĚuential contribution by Galor and Moav (2000), ac-
cording to which ability-biased technological transition captures both the increas-
ing supply of skills and the rise on wage inequality between and within diﬀerent
skill groups. A common dimension in the two models is that both mine and their
theory predicts the decline in unskilled wages. ĉe two distinguishing features,
relate to the fact that I also examine the experience premium and I provide an ex-
planationbasedonmarket failures, while theymainly focus on education and tech-
nology. Another relevant paper centering on technology and education byGould,
Moav and Weinberg (2001), shows that technology depreciation increases wage
inequality within the group of skilled and unskilled workers.
ĉe discussion so far concerns education and general experience but the dis-
tinction between tenure and general experience can shed more light on whether
employer learning is private or public. In particular, if employer learning is pri-
vate, then previous experience might yield some information but unambiguously
¹⁷See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a review of the SBTC and the ability biased technical
change explanations.
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ėrm-speciėc tenure is more informative. Some recent papers focus on the sepa-
ration of general experience, sector tenure and ėrm-speciėc tenure. For instance,
the case study of Dustmann and Meghir (2005) for Germany suggests that while
the acquisition of transferable skills seems to be important for the wage growth of
skilled workers early on in their career, unskilled workers beneėt primarily from
being aĨached to a particular ėrm. ĉis result highlights that the rise of the expe-
rience premium stressed by Krueger et al. (2010) might primarily represent ėrm-
speciėc tenure rather than general experience. Additionally, it provides suggestive
evidence that informational frictions are more important among unskilled work-
ers and this asymmetric eﬀect might drive the rising paĨern of the experience pre-
mium when diﬀerent skill groups are falsely pooled together. ĉis premise is also
in harmony with the major ėnding of Arcidiacono et al. (2010) that the return to
education due to employer learning is important only for the unskilled workers.¹⁸
2.5 FŃŊŇUSWĵĻĹ IłĹŅŊĵŀĽŉŏ Fĵķŉň
As far as the evolution of wage inequality is concerned, I employ mainly the skill
and the experience premium to examine both the between group wage inequality
but also its paĨern within diﬀerent education-experience groups. I use data for
white males working full-time full-year from the March Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS), the major data source for wage representing the entire US labor mar-
¹⁸However, an earlier but insightful study by Abraham and Farber (1987) sharply points out
that the measured positive cross-sectional return to tenure is largely a statistical artifact due to
the correlation of tenure with omiĨed variables representing the quality of the worker, job, or
worker-employer match. ĉey ėnd that aěer controlling for these omiĨed factors, earnings do
not rise much with tenure.
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ket, to ėnd some interesting paĨerns.¹⁹ Figure 10a shows that both the skill and
the experience premium increase signiėcantly. Figure 11a highlights that the skill
premium increases for both the experienced and the inexperienced workers but
the rise is greater for the laĨer. Figure 12a shows the evolution of the experience
premium within the group of skilled and unskilled workers. ĉis graph indicates
that a large part of the increase in the experience premium can be aĨributed to the
inĚuence of the group of unskilled workers. While ėgures 10b, 11b and 12b dis-
play the composition of workers for each education-experience group, indicating
that this is not a mere composition eﬀect. I summarize these wage inequality facts
below:
• Fact 1:ĉe skill premium increases despite the growing supply of skills.
• Fact 2:ĉe experience premium rises signiėcantly.
• Fact 3: ĉe skill premium grows sharply for inexperienced workers and
only moderately for the experienced ones.
• Fact 4: ĉere is a puzzling coexistence of rising experience premium for
unskilled workers and a Ěat paĨern for the skilled ones.
ĉeContribution of this Study
ĉe main contribution of this study is the revelation of a new theoretical chan-
nel between market failures and labor income distribution. Many studies have
¹⁹Figures 1 to 9 are taken from previous studies and are explained in section 3.5.1. For amore
detailed description of the data I use see section 3.5.2.
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examined why wage inequality has changed over time,²⁰ some papers enlighten
important aspects of the evolution of labor income dispersion; however, none
of them provides a uniėed explanation of all four facts of wage inequality that I
summarize above. In particular, the next chapter shows that when credit con-
straints relax, the average unskilled worker becomes less productive, as the relative
able individuals can abandon the uneducated pool. ĉis decreases initial wages
for unskilled-inexperienced labor and generates an increase in the experience pre-
mium only within the group of unskilled workers but also a sharp rise of the skill
premium for inexperienced workers and a moderate increase for the experienced
ones. ĉis theoretical result ėnds strong empirical support in the US and yields
some interesting policy implications.
²⁰For a review of this literature see Aghion et al. (1999), Acemoglu (2002), Hornstein et al.
(2005).
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''ĉere is all the diﬀerence in the world between treating peo-
ple equally and aĪempting to make them equal''.
Friedrich August Hayek,
Individualism and Economic Order (1948).
3
Formal Signals vs Informal Learning:
Education, Experience&Wage Inequality
Abstract: During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality
increased signiėcantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justiėcation for this paĨern,
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by introducing private employer learning in amodel of signaling with credit constraints.
In particular, I show that when ėnancial constraints relax, talented individuals can ac-
quire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled-inexperienced
wages andboostswage inequality. ĉis explanation is consistentwithUSdata from1970
to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with
a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced
wages remain Ěat. ĉemodel accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite
the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to
the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for
inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the
puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled
workers and its stable paĨern among the skilled ones. ĉe results hold under various
robustness checks and provide interesting implications about the potential conĚict be-
tween inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role
of minimum wage policy in determining the level of equilibrium wage inequality.
3.1 IłŉŇŃĸŊķŉĽŃł
TļĹ SļĵŇń IłķŇĹĵňĹ Ľł US WĵĻĹ IłĹŅŊĵŀĽŉŏ has been explained by several
diﬀerent approaches, focusing on technical change, international trade, immigra-
yĉis statementhas been aĨributed toAristotle. However, it has beendisputedor claimed to
have been misaĨributed to him, as thus far has not been found among his works. ĉe sentence
ėrst appears in 1974 in Time magazine, before being condensed to an epigram as ''Aristotle's
Axiom'' in Peter (1979).
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tion and the role of labor unions, among other. However, some paĨerns of rising
inequality, such as the evolution of the education wage premium for diﬀerent ex-
perience groups, have been almost unexplored by existed studies.
ĉemodel described in this chapter explains why wage inequality increases be-
tween diﬀerent education and experience groups, while it also accounts for within
group wage inequality paĨerns, such as the fact that the education premium in-
creases more for inexperienced workers, while the experience premium increases
only for the low-educated ones. Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 provide the static model,
comparative statics analysis and a dynamic framework, respectively. Section 3.5
connects the theoretical model with empirical evidence described in chapter 2.
Section3.6 explores empiricallywhether ability is sortedbeĨer in educationnowa-
days compared to the past, using theNational Longitudinal Surveys of Youth. Sec-
tion 3.7 analyzes quantitatively the theoretical framework of sorting, calibrates it
and incorporates it to theSBTCapproach. Section3.8provides robustness checks,
while the last section concludes.
3.2 A SŉĵŉĽķMŃĸĹŀ Ńĺ SŃŇŉĽłĻ
3.2.1 PŇĹŀĽŁĽłĵŇĽĹň
Agents. In this economy people live for three periods, time is discrete, and the
total population is comprised of heterogenous agents. In the mass one of total
population there are two types of workers, a proportion π of high ability workers
and a proportion ƥ   π of low ability ones. Every potential worker has a private
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information on his productivity. Each worker produces qj where j = fl; hg. In
particular, the low ability worker produces ql units of output and the high ability
one produces qh units (qh > ql). In addition to diﬀering in ability, workers also
vary in their initial wealth endowments. ĉerefore, there are two sources of het-
erogeneity stemming from innate ability and initial wealth diﬀerences.
ĉecost of education is dual. ĉere is a direct ėxed tuition costT and an indirect
diﬀerentiated eﬀort cost depending on agent type. ĉe eﬀort cost is higher for the
low ability worker kl > kh. ĉis notion of indirect cost captures Spence's (1973)
idea that education is more challenging for less able students. Spence measures
the added eﬀort required for low ability students to graduate from college as an
argument of the utility function. For simplicity, here this ismodeled as amonetary
cost.¹ Without loss of generality, it is also assumed that kh = Ƥ.
Every period people can either work or go to school. Although, some ėnd it
proėtable to acquire education when young or in the second period of their lives,
no rational agent prefers to invest in education at the ėnal periodof her life, as there
is no period to get the return of her investment in schooling. If they acquire educa-
tionwhen young, theywork as skilled for the second and third period of their lives,
for a wage wsƦ and wsƧ, respectively. If they do not acquire education they work for
the unskilled wage wuƥ during the ėrst period of their lives but during the second
period of their lives some of them can acquire education using the unskilled wage
they have accumulated during the ėrst period. Notice that education is amere sig-
¹One can think of this cost as paying additional tutors, purchasing supplemental materials or
simply time costs.
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nal, since it does not aﬀect worker's productivity.²
Firms. Firms compete over workers and set wage prices (Bertrand competition).
Firms are interested in productivity, which is unobservable in the ėrst period. ĉat
is why they observe workers' actions, they form beliefs and they set the ėrst period
wages accordingly. In the second period, ėrms privately learn the productivity of
their employees. We require to have at least two ėrms in order wages to equal the
perfectly competitive ones. ĉeproduction function is linear that implies constant
returns to scale in labor, which is the only input. Formally:
Yt(Qt) = AQt: (3.1)
Where A is the productivity parameter and Q denotes eﬃcient units of labor. In
particular, the low ability agent is endowed with ql units of eﬃcient labor, while
the high type is endowed with qh, where qh > ql. Firms pick a mixture of wages
that maximizes their proėts.
Timing. Timing is essential in this three-period model. In particular, during the
ėrst period of their lives some agents go to school, while others work aěer signing
one-period contracts. At the end of this period they receive the wages agreed and
they invest all theirwealth inone-periodbonds, for an interest rate rl. Someborrow
at a higher interest rate rb in order to access education. All loans are payed back at
²ĉis paper examines only the signalling approach of wage determination. However, this
approach can be combined with the human capital one and generate more realistic results.
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the last period of agents lives. So, loans taken either in period one or in period two,
are reimbursed at the end of period three.
During the second period of their lives ėrms privately observe workers' pro-
ductivity. Uneducated workers decide whether to go to school when old or not,
using the unskilled wagewuƥ that they earned. At the end of the second period they
receive the payment agreed and they invest their wealth in bonds. For the third pe-
riod employees provide their labor, receive the corresponding wages, repay their
loans, gather all their lifetime earnings and they consume them.
Firms privately observeworkers' productivity during the ėrst period of employ-
ment and at the second period they know the types of their employees. However,
this is private information for each ėrm. So, if workers want to be employed by
other ėrms as skilled, they still have to acquire education in the second period of
their lives. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the return to school invest-
ments can be higher compared to the return of bond investments. ĉus, agents
ėrst examine the possibility of investing in education and then in bonds.
Market Failures.ĉe functioning of the economy is aﬀected by threemarket fail-
ures: 1) asymmetric information, 2) credit market imperfections and 3) private em-
ployer learning. Primarily in this seĨing agents have a private information about
their ability type. Individuals of high ability try to signal their type to their poten-
tial employers. In fact, they invest in education to get their diplomas, and they use
them to signal their type, which leads to a higher wage. Notice that education is a
costly signal just as in Spence (1973) and the total cost diﬀers depending on agents'
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type.
ĉe secondmarket failure relates to the functioning of ėnancialmarkets. I intro-
duce credit market imperfections following Galor and Zeira (1993). So there is a
lending interest rate rl andaborrowing interest rate rb and it is true that rb > rl. ĉe
diﬀerence between the two rates of interest stems from the possibility of default-
ing, which requires the adoption of a costly screening technology by the lenders.
In this partial equilibrium small-open-economy framework, rl equals the world in-
terest rate. ĉat is why the relatively lesswealthy agents cannot invest in education.
ĉis assumption combined with the asymmetries of information render ėrms in-
capable of distinguishing the low-type from the credit constrained high typework-
ers, as in Hendel et al. (2005).
ĉe new element of my model is that employers privately observe worker per-
formance and aěer a period of employment the type of each worker is revealed.
ĉat is why aěer a period of employment only the incumbent ėrm knows the type
of its workers. ĉe potential competitors still face informational frictions about
the type of potential new workers. All the above is common knowledge.
Additionally, the use of a set ofmild assumptions facilitates the analysis, without
harming the robustness of the theoretical framework. In particular, it is assumed
that ėrms are price takers and the production function is subject to constant re-
turns to scale. Price taking behavior and ėrm homogeneity is assumed in order to
focus our analysis on imperfections related to information asymmetries and credit
constraints. However, extending the present framework with the inclusion of het-
erogenous ėrms and diﬀerentiated jobs / tasks might generate some interesting
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implications. Constant returns guarantee that the marginal productivity does not
depend on the number of workers, facilitating the analysis of wage determination.
A further assumption relates to the indivisible nature of educational investments,
which implies that education is a discrete binary choice taking either the value 0
or 1.
ĉeGame.More formally, the game can be deėned as follows:
Deėnition 1 ĉe game is deėned as G = hN;B; hAi; τ i; yi; piii2Wi, where:
1. N is the set of players, there exists a mass one of workers W and F ėrms, which
perfectly compete.
2. Ai is the set of actions forworker i. A = AƥAƦAƧ. WhereAƥ = fschool; notg,
AƦ = fschool; notg and AƧ = ;, since in period three everything is predeter-
mined for agents by their previous actions.
3. B denotes the set of beliefs formed by the representative ėrm aĜer observing the
actions of senders.
4. τ i is the types of player i. Ability type can be either low or high, while their initial
wealth can be any non-negative value given by an unspeciėed cdf.
5. yi : A ! R is the payoﬀ function for player i.
6. pi is the probability distribution over the types of workers for the entire society.
In this game, pi = ƥ, which means that all players have the same views for the
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probability distribution of types for the entire society but they cannot aĪach types
to each agent i.
Lifetime Earnings. All agents maximize their lifetime earnings, given their type
and initial wealth. In this economy there are four classes of agents, diﬀering on
their type and initial wealth. Below I calculate the lifetime earnings for each social
class.
Self-FundedYoungStudents:ĉeėrst group is comprisedby thosewhohaveenough
initial wealth to acquire education when young without borrowing. ĉose with
wealth bi  T+ kj get a lifetime income of:
yA = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(bi   T  kj) + (ƥ+ rl)wsƦ + wsƧ: (3.2)
Young Borrowers: Workers with wealth bi 2 [b;T+ kj) can access proėtably the
credit markets. However, since they cannot cover the total cost of education, seek
for external funding, borrow and get lifetime income of:
yB = (ƥ+ rb)Ʀ(bi   T  kj) + (ƥ+ rl)wsƦ + wsƧ: (3.3)
At the second period, workers who have worked as unskilled know that their em-
ployment ėrms have observed their productivity. So they can bargain with their
employmentėrms, using thepossibility of acquiring educationwhenold andwork-
ing for other ėrms. Notice that even workers with zero initial wealth can cover the
tuition cost using their ėrst-period labor income, provided that wuƥ > T. ĉe cru-
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cial point is whether they are talented enough to cover the eﬀort cost kj.
Self-funded Old Students: Workers with bi 2 [T+ kj   (ƥ+ rl)wuƥ ; b) can acquire
education using their own funds aěer a period of employment and get:
yC = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + bi)  (ƥ+ rl)(T+ kj) + wsƧ: (3.4)
ĉere can also be old borrowers but as you will see later on, we exclude this case.
Uneducated: Agentswith initial wealth bi < T+kj (ƥ+rl)wuƥ remain uneducated.
ĉese agents get a lifetime income of:
yD = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + bi) + (ƥ+ rl)wu;jƦ + wu;jƧ : (3.5)
Assumptions. I propose the following four assumptions that aﬀect the actions
of the agents. At this stage these assumptions depend also on the endogenous
variables but once I solve the game (under these assumptions), I will be able to
substitute out the endogenous variables and check whether the equilibrium that I
guessed can be veriėed. In particular, I make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: ĉe eﬀort cost for the low type is suﬃciently high.
kl >
(ƥ+ rl)(wsƦ   wu;lƦ ) + wsƧ   wu;lƧ   (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + T)
(ƥ+ rl)Ʀ
(3.6)
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ĉe intuition is simple: for low types the eﬀort cost kl is high enough that no low
type (not even the richest) ėnds it proėtable to invest in education. Assumption 1
comes from the following comparison of lifetime earnings yD > yA.
Assumption 2: Even the lowest possible unskilled wage can cover the tuition cost.
T  (ƥ+ rl)ql (3.7)
ĉe logic is straightforward: all the initially constrainedhigh types cango to school
when old, since even the minimum unskilled wage (wuƥ (min) = ql) is enough to
cover the tuition cost (which is the only cost for high types; recall kh = Ƥ). No
agent borrows when old.
Assumption 3: Credit constraints make it proėtable only for some high types to
borrow and go to school when young.
bi  (ƥ+ r
b)ƦT+ (ƥ+ rl)wuƥ   (ƥ+ rl)(wsƦ + T)
(ƥ+ rb)Ʀ   (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ  b
 (3.8)
ĉeabove inequality is an incentive compatibility constraint, stating thatonly some
relatively wealthy agents ėnd it proėtable to borrow and go to school when young.
Assumption 3 comes from the following comparison of lifetime earnings yB  yC,
which implies that high types with wealth bi  b prefer to go to school when
young rather than when old. Notice that this assumption yB  yC covers also the
case yA  yC, which means that high types prefer to go early to school rather than
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late. ĉis is true since CMI imply that it is always beĨer to be self-funded rather
than borrow yA > yB.
Assumption 4: High types prefer to separate themselves from the pool of unedu-
cated workers even when old.
T <
wsƧ   wu;PƧ + (ƥ+ rl)wu;PƦ
ƥ+ rl
(3.9)
Intuitively, for the high types who do not go to school when young (those with
initial wealth bi < b), it is always beĨer to separate themselves from the pool
of uneducated workers, by going to school when old. Assumption 4 comes from
yC > yDpooling. Where yDpooling is:
yD = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + bi) + (ƥ+ rl)wu;PƦ + wu;PƧ and wuƥ = wu;PƦ = wu;PƧ .
Discussion of theAssumptions.What do these assumptions imply for ėrm's be-
liefs? Assumption 1 implies that all educated workers are high types. So, ėrms
know that a signal of schooling can be sent only by high types. ĉis implies in turn
that the skilledwage equals the productivity of the high typewsƦ = wsƧ = ws
0
Ƨ = qh.
Assumption 4 implies that those who do not go to school even at period t = Ʀ are
low types. So, the unskilledwages of the second and the third period equal the pro-
ductivity of the low type wuƦ = wuƧ = ql. Also notice that no agent goes to school
at the third period of his life, as he will not be able get the return of educational
investments. ĉat is why the only wage that we have to determine is wuƥ .
Unambiguously there are oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs. However, I can elimi-
37
nate them as unreasonable using the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987).
In particular, ėrm's belief that ''an educated worker can be of low type'' is unrea-
sonable, since assumption 1 guarantees that all low types are beĨer oﬀ without
education. Accordingly, the belief that ''in period two, high types try to ėnd a job
to other ėrms for a higher wage'' can be eliminated. ĉe logic is simple, prior try-
ing to work for other ėrms, high types consider the following two reactions, in a
forward-looking sense: ėrst, in the absence of education other ėrms still cannot
separate low from high types (private employer learning); second, if uneducated
high types try to ėnd a job to other ėrms for a higher wage, then all low types have
an incentive to mimic them, this generates the pooled wage for all the uneducated
workerswu;PƦ = wu;PƧ = wuƥ . But fromassumption 4we know that high types prefer
to separate themselves from low types by going to school when old rather than re-
maining to the pool of all uneducated workers and by assumption 2 we know that
they can do this.
3.2.2 EŅŊĽŀĽĶŇĽŊŁ
I employ the following equilibrium concept
Deėnition 2 A Perfect Bayesian signaling equilibrium is deėned as:
1. choices of education in the ėrst period and second period, based on skills and ini-
tial wealth bequests: Aƥ (qj; bi) 2 fschool; notg, AƦ(qj; bi) 2 fschool; notg;
2. beliefs by ėrms about worker type in the ėrst period of employment given their
education level Bƥ(jjAƥ), 8 Aƥfschool; notg and BƦ(jjAƦ), 8 AƦfschool; notg;
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3. and equilibrium wages: wuƥ ;wu;hƦ ;wu;lƦ ;wsƦ;wu;hƧ ;wu;lƧ and wsƧ.
Such that:
1. workers maximize their lifetime earnings,
2. ėrms maximize their proėts,
3. labor markets clear.
We can ėnd all the wages above, apart fromwuƥ . In order to have an equilibriumwe
have to determine the wage wuƥ .
Supply of Unskilled Labor in Period 1.
ĉe supply for unskilled labor is:
P(ujh) = P(bi < b): (3.10)
Where P() represents the cumulative density function of the initial wealth distri-
bution for high ability workers. In Figure 5 we can examine how the parameters
of the model aﬀect the supply curve. P(ujh) represents the probability that the
uneducated worker is of high ability. Generally, the higher b is, the greater is the
number of high ability agents who do not get an education: b " ) P(ujh) ".
On the supply curve, an increase in the ėrst period unskilledwage raises thewealth
cutoﬀ b by reducing the payoﬀ to education, which raises P(ujh) (see equation
(8)). Hence, the supply curve is upward sloping. An increase in tuition level T
increases b by driving down the return to education.
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Figure 5:Unskilled-Labor Market
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So, for any given unskilled wage, more workers can not get an education, shiěing
the supply curve to the right. More severe creditmarket imperfections, which alge-
braically translates to an increase in the wedge rb   rl, the diﬀerence between the
borrowing rate of interest and the lending rate of interest, both shiěs the supply
curve to the right and reduces its slope. Notice that rl is constant and equal to the
exogenous world interest rate, that is why an increase of rb makes less credit fric-
tionsmore severe. So, varying only the borrowing rate rb for a given world interest
rate rl, will aﬀect the degree of ėnancial development, which is extremely impor-
tant for the comparative statics analysis. To see why, re-write b from equation (8)
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as:
b = (ƥ+ r
b)ƦT+ (ƥ+ rl)wuƥ   (ƥ+ rl)(wsƦ + T)
(ƥ+ rb)Ʀ   (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ (3.11)
From the above equation it is clear that an increase in the wedge rb   rl leads to
a higher b and thus a higher supply of unskilled labor. ĉe wedge rb   rl, de-
pends only on rb, since rl is ėxed and equals the world interest rate. Furthermore,
a larger wedge raises the slope of the supply curve. Intuitively, an increase in the
wedgemeans thatworkers aremore sensitive to changes in the return to education.
Overall, given the levels of ws and rl, for the supply curve it is true that:
• Changes on the Supply curve: P(bi < b)(wuƥ (+);T; rb).
An increase (decrease) in the ėrst period unskilled wage wuƥ , increases (de-
creases) the probability that the high type is uneducated P(ujh).
• Shiěs of the Supply curve: P(bi < b)(wuƥ (+);T; rb).
An increase (decrease) on the tuition cost T or the borrowing interest rate
rb, shiěs the supply curve outwards (inwards).
• Changes on the Slope of the Supply curve: P(bi < b)(wuƥ (+);T; rb).
An increase (decrease)on theborrowing interest rate rb, decreases (increases)
the slope of the supply curve.
Demand for Unskilled Labor in Period 1.
What I call demand is in fact, theėrmswillingness topay for a givenmixof high and
low ability workers. Since ėrms compete over workers, their willingness to pay a
wage equals the expected productivity. Under the assumption of constant returns
to scale themarginal productivity and so the wages do not depend on the quantity
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of unskilled workers. Equation (12) below, determines the unskilled wage. Using
(12) I derive (13), which is the demand curve:
wuƥ = ql

ƥ  π
ƥ  π + πP(ujh)

+ qh

πP(ujh)
ƥ  π + πP(ujh)

: (3.12)
Solving for P(ujh) gives the following demand function:
P(ujh) = ƥ  π
π

wuƥ   ql
qh   wuƥ

: (3.13)
ĉe demand curve for unskilled workers is upward sloping and this feature of the
model drives many of my ėndings. Intuitively, as fewer workers get an education,
ėrms realize that the average uneducatedworker ismore likely to be of high ability.
ĉus, they are willing to pay more for unskilled workers.
EquilibriumUnskilledWage in Period 1.
An equilibrium occurs when the percentage of high ability workers who cannot
get an education at an unskilled wage wuƥ is equal to the percentage of high ability
workers that a ėrm needs to be in the unskilled pool of workers in order to break
even by oﬀering wage wuƥ . I use the following equation f() to formalize my argu-
ment:
f : [ql; qP] ! [ql; qP] : f(wuƥ ) =
(ƥ  π)ql + πqhP(bi < b(wuƥ ;T; rb))
ƥ  π + πP(bi < b(wuƥ ;T; rb))
: (3.14)
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An equilibrium occurs when f(wuƥ ) = wuƥ . For locally tâtonnement stable equilib-
ria, prices evolve according to @wuƥ=@t = f(wuƥ )   wuƥ . An equilibrium is locally
tâtonnement stable if, whenever the initial price vector is suﬃciently close to it, the
dynamic trajectory causes relative prices to converge the equilibrium price. ĉe
condition of tâtonnement stability is equivalent to the requirement that the slope
of the supply curve must exceed the slope of the demand curve. ĉe following
proposition summarizes existence and stability.
Proposition 1 (Existence, Stability) LetP()be a continuously diﬀerentiable func-
tion. ĉen, there exists at least one stable equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix A.
If the slope of the supply curve exceeds the slope of the demand curve and under
the initial condition for P(ujh) = Ƥ of excess demand and the terminal condition
forP(ujh) = ƥ of excess supply, there exists at least one tâtonnement stable equilib-
rium. Generally, an equilibrium exist when the high ability workers who can not
get an education coincides with the mass of high-ability uneducated population
that the ėrms wish to employ in order to unskilled wage to maximize their proėts.
ĉe intuition of stability in this seĨingmust be straightforward. Consider ėgure
5, where the horizontal axis measures the probability that the high type is uned-
ucated P(ujh) and the vertical the unskilled wage the ėrst period wuƥ . ĉe supply
curve has a higher slope of the demand curve but both are upward sloping. Since
the slope of the supply is higher than the slope of the demand curve this equi-
librium is stable. Now consider a wage wuƥ above the equilibrium level. At this
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level we have excess demand.³ ĉis wage will decline in order to reach the equi-
librium level, since for this wage wuƥ , we have excess demand P(ujh)D > P(ujh)S
(recall that demand is the ėrm's willingness to pay). ĉismeans that ėrms are will-
ing to pay this wage only when the probability that the high type is uneducated,
is P(ujh)D. But the supply of uneducated high-type workers is P(ujh)S, which is
lower than P(ujh)D. ĉis means that ėrms set the wages at a lower level compared
towuƥ . ĉis happens until we reach the locally stable equilibrium. In the same spirit
when wages are lower compared to the equilibrium level, we have excess supply
and wages increase until they reach the equilibrium level.
Verify theSolution. So far, the assumptions (1-4) dependedon endogenous vari-
ables, aswell. However, I have solved the game for these values andnowI canverify
the solution that I guessed. ĉis transforms assumptions (1-4) into assumptions
(1'-4'):
Assumption 1:
kl > (ƥ+ r
l)(qh   ql) + qh   ql   (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + T)
(ƥ+ rl)Ʀ
(3.15)
³Generally, when the demand curve is downward sloping and the supply is upward sloping,
for higher prices compared to the equilibrium prices we have excess supply. However, in this
graph the demand curve is upward sloping, that iswhywehave excess demand. ĉat is in our case
(of upward-sloping demand curve), in the condition for local tâtonnement stability @wuƥ =@t =
f(wuƥ )   wuƥ , the function g(w) = f(wuƥ )   wuƥ represents the excess supply function and not
the excess demand function, which is generally the case (when the demand curve is downward
sloping and the supply is upward sloping).
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Assumption 2:
T  (ƥ+ rl)ql (3.16)
Assumption 3:
b = (ƥ+ r
b)ƦT+ (ƥ+ rl)wuƥ   (ƥ+ rl)(qh + T)
(ƥ+ rb)Ʀ   (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ (3.17)
Assumption 4:
T < q
h + rlwuƥ
ƥ+ rl
(3.18)
Notice that all the assumptions above depend on parameters only, since I have
proved that an equilibrium wage wuƥ exists and takes values from ql to qP.
Bargaining. Our analysis so far implies that high ability agents with adequate
wealth to acquire educationwhen young, bi  b, work for the skilledwage during
the second and the third period of their livesws = qh. Similarly, low ability agents
do never invest in education, so they work as unskilled for the rest of their lives.
However, the determination of the employment path of high ability agents with
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wealth bi < b is not so simple. In particular, the discussion so far excludes the
possibility of bargaining between ėrms and workers. However, we have reason to
expect that aěer ėrms having privately observed the productivity of their workers,
there can be mutually beneėcial bargaining between ėrms and workers.
Firms know that high ability agents with bi < b, produce qh. However dur-
ing the ėrst period of their employment they oﬀer them wuƥ , since they cannot
aﬀord signaling their type. During the second period of their lives, their type is
known only by their employment ėrms. When old, these workers can bargain for
a higher wage and threaten ėrms that if they do not pay them the high wage that
they deserve, they will ėnd a job to other ėrms. ĉeir employers argue that the
other ėrms do not know their type so in the absence of a degree they will not re-
ceive the skilled wage; instead they will get wu;PƦ and wu;PƦ for the remaining two
periods. Workers reply that they will acquire education in order to signal their
type to the other ėrms and get the skilled wage. By assumption 2 ėrms know
that this threat is credible for all the credit constrained high types, who are unedu-
cated in period 1. ĉat is why ėrms agree with bargainers to oﬀer them the wage
wu;hƦ = wu;hƧ = [qh   (ƥ + rl)T]=(Ʀ + rl) that makes them indiﬀerent between
staying aĨached to the same ėrm and going to school when old in order to work as
skilled for other ėrms, during the last period of their lives. By assumption 4 high
types ėnd it proėtable to separate themselves from the unskilled pool, even when
they are old. Additionally, under a time-cost for switching jobs, workers are bet-
ter of by accepting their employment ėrms oﬀers. Respectively, if low types face
a time-cost when they bargain with their employment ėrms unsuccessfully, they
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will never choose to bargain. Notice that mutually beneėcial bargaining implies
that nobody invests in education when old!
ĉis process of bargaining generates a return to experience not as a result of a
standard learning-by-doing process but as an informational beneėt of employer
learning, due to the combination of credit market imperfections, asymmetric in-
formation and bargaining. Successful bargainers receive the wage they would have
obtained if they had invested in school when old and so if they had worked only in
the last period of their lives. So, they get wu;hƦ = wu;hƧ = [qh   (ƥ+ rl)T]=(Ʀ+ rl)
for the second and third period of their lives.
Lemma 1 In the model described above there is a return to experience due to employer
learning. ĉis return is generated as a result of individual bargaining, and it is positive
for high types, while it is negative for the low types.
High ability workers, bargain based on the possibility of acquiring education and
ėnding employment in other ėrms. ĉis bargaining is successful for all the high
abilityworkers, since all of themhave enoughwealth to cover the cost of education
in the second period of their lives.
Can employers oﬀer a higher wage than wu;hƦ and aĨract more uneducated high
types? ĉe answer is negative, since ėrms that try to employ workers from com-
petitors, face asymmetries of information even during the second period. So they
cannot distinguish the high from the low types. Additionally, when low types ob-
serve that constrained high types seek for employment, they always have an incen-
tive to mimic them. However, from assumption 4, high types always ėnd it prof-
itable to bargain and separate themselves from pooling with the low types. Fur-
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thermore, employers always wish to keep the constrained high types in the ėrm,
since theyderive a proėt bypaying them less than theirmarginal productivity. ĉat
is why an uneducated agent who seeks for employment when old is perceived as a
low type and so he will get the lowest possible wage wu;lƦ = wu;lƧ = ql. Under the
time-cost for switching jobs, low types also stay to the initial ėrm. Importantly, the
proposition below states that in this seĨing ėrms derive an informational rent.
Proposition 2 Firms derive an information rent as a result of beĪer sorting. ĉe cor-
responding surplus for ėrms is generated due to the combination of credit constraints,
information asymmetries and privately observable productivity aĜer the ėrst period of
employment (private employer learning).
Proof See Appendix A.
ĉe intuition is simple. Initially, ėrms employ workers without deriving proėts.
However, as they get familiar with their employees, they can sort them eﬃciently
and obtain a surplus due to beĨer sorting. Notice that ėrms derive a proėt by oﬀer-
ing the bargaining agents a lower wage compared to their productivity, since they
subtract the tuition cost from the oﬀered wage and they split it in the remaining
two periods of employment. Bargaining is a mutually beneėcial process, as both
ėrms and bargainers become beĨer oﬀ.
ĉe functioning of the Economy. So far, I have presented the basic features of
themodel and now I can shortly review the functioning of this economy using the
diagrammatic illustration of Figure 6. ĉe black nodes denote that a decision is
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taken by the agent, while in the transparent nodes there is no option by the agent
and the employment path is predetermined by previous choices. On the branches
I display the choices and on the nodes thewages. ĉe subscript on thewage always
denotes the time. ĉis graph is essential for the understanding of agent and ėrm
behavior in this model.
Figure 6: Equilibrium Tree
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ĉis section examines the interactionbetween credit frictions, skill and experience
premia. In a stable equilibrium, anything thatmakes it easier ormore aĨractive for
people to become educated raises the skill premium. ĉe intuition is simple. Low-
ering the borrowing rate or tuition fees shiěs the supply curve for unskilled labor
to the leě. With a normal downward-sloping demand curve, such a shiě leads to a
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rise in thewage since demandwould exceed supply. However, in ourmodel the de-
mand curve is upward-sloping, so the wage decreases to restore the equilibrium.
Importantly, policies that equalize educational opportunity such as lowering rb,
actually increase wage inequality. I summarize this logic in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3 In any stable equilibrium, less severe credit constraints increase the skill
premium. ĉe rise in the skill premium occurs both within the group of experienced and
inexperienced workers.
Proof See Appendix A.
ĉe proposition above is in harmonywith Figure 1 (Appendix B) that shows a rise
of the skill premium within any group of experience. ĉis means that less severe
credit constraints would increase skill premium andwage inequality. Additionally,
if the borrowing interest rate decreases, fewer high ability workers will remain un-
educated and by (9) we can see that b will fall, generating a decrease in the initial
wage of the unskilled and inexperiencedworker, which in turn leads to an increase
in the experience premium. Notice that the rise in the experience premium is gen-
erated due to inĚuence of the unskilled workers and not the skilled ones. More
formally the proposition below holds:
Proposition 4 In any stable equilibrium, less severe credit constraints increase the ex-
perience premium. ĉe experience premium rises only within the group of unskilled
workers, while it remains constant within the group of skilled workers.
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Proof See Appendix A.
ĉe ėndings summarized in Proposition 4 ėnd strong empirical support byUS ev-
idence presented in Figure 2 (appendix B). ĉe important result of propositions
3 and 4 is that less severe credit market imperfections increase wage inequality in
a dual way: by raising both the skill and the experience premium. ĉis is the pat-
tern that many developed countries experienced over the past three decades and
especially US, UK and Canada. A diagrammatic exposition of propositions 3 and
4 can be seen in Figure 7.
Figure 7:Comparative Statics in a Stable Equilibrium
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Notice that less severe credit constraints generated by a decrease in the borrowing
interest rate rb, increase the slope of the supply curve and shiě the whole supply
curve inwards. In a stable equilibrium -where the slopeof the supply curve exceeds
that of the demand curve - this decreases the unskilled wage of period one and so
it increases the experience premium, since both wu;hƦ =wuƥ and wu;lƦ =wuƥ increase, as
well as the skill premium wsƦ=wuƥ raises too. In an unstable equilibrium the results
are reverted.
Within Group Skill & Experience Premia 
                                                              
                                                                 Wage Premia                       Credit Frictions Relax  
                                                                                                        
      Skill Wage Premium:                                
          Inexperienced                                    ws2 / w
u
1                             Increases  Sharply 
          Experienced                                       ws3 / w
u
2                             Increases Slightly 
      Experience Wage Premium:  
          Young High School grads (t2 / t1)           w
u
2 / w
u
1                                    Increases 
          Old High School grads (t3 / t2)           w
u
3 / w
u
2                                    Constant   
          College graduates                             ws3 / w
s
2                                    Constant 
Note: This table summarizes the results of propositions 3 and 4. When credit constraints become less 
severe both the skill and the experience wage premia increase. Where wu2 indicates the average wage of 
all the unskilled workers at period 2. Accordingly wu3 denotes the average wage of all unskilled workers for 
period 3. Also, notice that both wu3 / wu2 and ws3 / ws2 are always constant. For more details on the 
derivation of these results see the proofs of propositions 3 and 4 at the appendix. 
ĉe table above illustrates the evolution of the skill premium within experience
group and the experience premiumwithin educational group, as credit constraints
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become less severe. ĉe skill premium increases for both experience groups, which
is in harmony with the empirical evidence for US, represented at Figure 1 (ap-
pendix B). ĉe experience premium increases signiėcantly within the group of
high school graduates, while it remains constantwithin the group of college gradu-
ates. ĉis ėnding is also in accordance with theUS labormarket paĨern presented
in Figure 2 (appendix B). From propositions 3 and 4 the following corollary can
be derived.
Corollary 1 From propositions 3 and 4, we deduce that when credit ěictions become
less severe, the rise in the skill premium is larger in magnitude within the group of un-
skilled workers, compared to the group of skilled workers.
ĉevalidity of the above-mentioned result lies on the fact that a relaxationof credit
constraints generates a larger decline in unskilled wages for inexperienced work-
ers (wuƥ ) compared to the average unskilled wage for experienced workers (wuƦ).
ĉis result comes directly from the proof of proposition 4. Additionally, we know
that the skilled wages for inexperienced and experienced workers are equal (wsƦ =
wsƧ = qh) and remain unaltered as credit frictions relax. ĉerefore, the increase in
the skill premium for inexperienced workers (wsƦ=wuƥ ) is larger in magnitude com-
pared to the increase in the skill premium for experiencedworkers (wsƧ=wuƦ), as the
nominators do not change when credit frictions relax but the denominator of the
former ratio declines by more compared to the laĨer. ĉat is why the corollary
holds.
ĉis result provides an explanation to the puzzling observation byCard andDi-
Nardo (2002b) which can be illustrated in ėgures 1 and 11 (appendix B) and is
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stated as follows in their own words:
While the rise in the average wage gap between college and high-school work-
ers has been extensively documented, the fact that the increases have been very
diﬀerent for diﬀerent age groups is less well known. Speciėcally, the rise in the
college/high-school wage gap for men is most pronounced among young work-
ers entering the labor force aěer the late 1970s. Moreover, the paĨern of this
increase does not appear to be well explained by either the rising-skill-price or
computer-use/skill complementarity versions of SBTC.
However, onemust also examine the behavior of wage premia in the extreme cases
of ėnancial development. In fact, in the case of extreme credit market imperfec-
tions, where the possibility of borrowing does not exist, the skill premium is min-
imized, while experience premium is low. As ėnancial frictions relax both the ex-
perience and the skill premium increase. In the case of perfect ėnancial markets,
where everyone can borrow any amount, the skill and the experience premium is
maximized. So, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5 Both the skill and the experience premium increase monotonically as
credit constraints relax.
Proof See Appendix A.
3.3.1 MŊŀŉĽńŀĹ EŅŊĽŀĽĶŇĽĵ, SĹŀĹķŉĽŃł ĵłĸMĽłĽŁŊŁWĵĻĹ PŃŀĽķŏ
In our economy there can be multiple equilibria. Whenever the supply curve in-
tersects the demand curve from below then the equilibrium is stable, otherwise it
54
is an unstable equilibrium. For instance in the graph below we have three equilib-
ria, denoted asA;B andC. EquilibriaA andC are stable, while equilibrium B is an
unstable one.
      
     
Demand
Supply  
  
Labor market policies and in particular minimum wage policy aﬀects the equilib-
riumoutcome and ultimately the level of wage inequality. ĉis can be illustrated in
the graph below. Consider the three equilibria A;B and C. When policy-makers
try to determine the level of the minimum wage in this economy they consider to
set it either at a high level, say wuƥ or at a low level, say wuƥ . If they set the min-
imum wage at the high level wuƥ , the economy would reach equilibrium C that
corresponds at a relatively high wage for unskilled inexperienced workers, which
in turn would keep wage inequality at a low level. Alternatively, if policy-makers
set the minimum wage at the low rate wuƥ , the economy would reach equilibrium
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A, which corresponds to a relatively lowwage for unskilled inexperienced workers
and therefore to higher wage inequality.
Notice thatwhenever theminimumwage is set above thewage that corresponds
to theunstable equilibriumB, the economyreaches the stable equilibriumC, which
leads to a low equilibrium wage inequality. When the minimumwage is set below
or equal to the level that corresponds to equilibrium A, then the economy con-
verges to A and we have a high equilibrium wage inequality. ĉe interesting rage
of theminimumwage starts fromwages above the level of equilibriumA and ends
to the wage of the unstable equilibrium B. For this range of minimum wages the
dynamic trajectory pushes the equilibrium to A but the minimum wage distorts
the market mechanism and does not allow the economy to reach this level. So, in
this case the equilibrium cannot be determined and only aěer a shock the econ-
omy can reach the stable equilibrium at point C.
ĉis raises concerns related to unemployment, as policy-makers might decide
to decrease minimum wages in order to increase employment. A discussion on
this tradeoﬀ is beyond the scope of this study. However, Card andKrueger (1994)
show empirically that decreasing the minimum wage does not lead to an increase
in employment.
3.4 TļĹDŏłĵŁĽķ ŉļŇĹĹ-ńĹŇĽŃĸOLGEķŃłŃŁŏ
ĉe discussion so far concerns a static three-period economy. In this section I ex-
tend the staticmodel to a dynamic one. For this purpose I employ the overlapping
generations (OLG)model developedbyAllais (1947), Samuelson (1958) andDi-
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amond (1965). ĉe only diﬀerence compared to their approach, is that I employ a
three-periodOLGmodel, instead of the standard two-periodOLG framework. So
the demography of the dynamic economy can be described as follows: Amass one
of agents, say generation t is born at period t and lives for three periods, at period t
agents are young, at t+ ƥ they are middle-aged and at t+ Ʀ they are old. When an
agent reaches the second period of his/her life gives rise to one other agent.⁴ ĉis
generates dynasties overtime. Generation t+ ƥ is born at period t+ ƥ and lives for
three periods at period t+ ƥ agents are young, at t+ Ʀ they are middle-aged and at
t+Ƨ they are old. Generation t+Ʀ is born at period t+Ʀ and lives for three periods
at period t+ Ʀ agents are young, at t+ Ƨ they aremiddle-aged and at t+ ƨ they are
old. And so on. Notice that in period t + Ƨ all three generations, grandchildren,
children and parents overlap. ĉis can be illustrated at the graph below.
I extend the static seĨing to a dynamic three-periodOLGmodel for consistency
betweenmymodel and the demography of theCurrent Population Survey (CPS).
ĉestatic versionof themodel refers toone cohort ofworkers, for instance individ-
uals born at year t, while in fact in the CPS is a repeated cross section representing
the US labor market, where diﬀerent generations overlap over the years. Econo-
metricians calculate the skill and the experiencewage premia annually but at every
given year young,middle-aged and old agents overlap. ĉat is why, for the purpose
of this study, I consider the three-periodOLGmodel a satisfactory representation
of the American labor market.
Proposition 6 Modiėed versions of Propositions 1 - 5 ěom the static model, hold also
⁴ĉis assumption is not as unrealistic as it might seem, since it resembles modern societies
were statistically each couple gives rise to approximately two children (a couple).
57
in the steady state of the dynamic three-period OLGmodel.
In the static model I have implicitly assumed that agents collect their wealth and
consume only at the third period of their lives, the entire wealth they have accu-
mulated. ĉis is biologically unrealistic, as agents have to consume every period in
order to survive. At the dynamic three-period OLG framework I can innocuously
assume that every period the consumption of the entire dynasty (grandchildren,
children and parents) comes from the lifetime earnings of the eldest altruistic par-
ents. ĉis develops further and improves the model.
   Generation1   
t t+1  t+2    
 
    Generation2
t+1  t+2 t+3
        Generation3
  t+2 t+3 t+4
Furthermore, I still assume that initial endowments are stochastic and there are
no intergenerational bequests. Actually, there are intergenerational concerns, as
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parents feed both their children and their grandchildren; however, for simplicity I
do not allow for intergenerational bequests. ĉis is an assumption I can relax at a
modiėed version of this model, which would be more appropriate for the exami-
nation of intergenerational justice.
Importantly, at the steady state the three-period OLG model inherits all the
properties of the static model, including the propositions that are based on the
comparative statics analysis. ĉe cohort analysis that is based on the static model
canbe extended to this three-periodOLGversion that resemblesmore thedemog-
raphy of the dataset that I use, which is the Current Population Survey (CPS). Un-
der the assumption that parents are altruistic with respect to consumption but not
with respect to bequests the following proposition holds.
Notice that in period t+ Ʀ for instance, where all three generations overlap, we
derive the following equilibrium wages for the steady state: wuƥ , wu;hƦ , wu;lƦ , wsƦ ,
wu;hƧ ,wu;lƧ andwsƧ . Which are exactly the sameas in the staticmodel. Frompropo-
sitions 2 and 3, for example, we can infer that at the steady state an economy with
less severe credit constraints has higher wage inequality, generated by a higher skill
andexperiencepremium, compared tooneother economywithmore severe credit
constraints. ĉe reason why the above proposition holds is that my approach fo-
cuses on within group wage comparisons, for instance the skill premium within a
group of a particular level of experience. ĉis actually allows me to extend the re-
sults of the static model to the dynamic three-period OLGmodel. I consider this
as an additional methodological contribution.
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3.5 EŋĽĸĹłķĹ ĺŇŃŁ ŉļĹ CŊŇŇĹłŉ PŃńŊŀĵŉĽŃł SŊŇŋĹŏ
One of the most important result from the theoretical analysis is that when credit
constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uned-
ucated pool, the unskilled-inexperienced wages decline and this generates both
an increase in the skill premium for inexperienced workers but also an increase in
the experience premium only for unskilled workers. ĉis occurs as in both wage
ratios the denominator declines. ĉis section, examines whether this theoretical
prediction ėnds empirical support, using data from theMarchCurrent Population
Survey (CPS), the major data source for wage representing the entire US labor
market. I ėrst show that the data I use are in perfect harmony with sources used
from previous studies, then I examine in more detail the empirical facts that my
study accounts for and ultimately I show why the fall of unskilled-inexperienced
wages is so crucial.
3.5.1 EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ EŋĽĸĹłķĹ ĺŇŃŁ PŇĹŋĽŃŊň SŉŊĸĽĹň
Several studies examine the issue of measurement of economic inequality.⁵ Apart
from the mainstream indexes of income inequality, such as the Gini coeﬃcient or
the variance of log-wages, economists developed new ways to observe the evolu-
tion of wage inequality, such as the evolution of the top incomes⁶ or the returns to
education and experience.⁷ However, a growing body of research measure labor
⁵See Schutz (1954), Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
⁶See PikeĨy and Saez (2003, 2006), Atkinson et al. (2010).
⁷ĉis branch of literature pioneered by the work of JacobMincer (1974) and revived during
the 90's by Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn et al. (1993) and others. Since then it has aĨracted
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income inequality using the skill, the experience and the gender wage premium,
mainly for convenience when theoretical models are calibrated or estimated using
real data. Krueger et al. (2010) report evidence for nine developed countries, for
the increasing paĨern of the skill and the experience, as well as for the narrowing
gender wage gap over the past three decades. ĉey ėnd that for the skill premium
there is a clear dichotomy, since it increased signiėcantly inUS,UK,Canada,Mex-
ico and Sweden, while it has declined inGermany, Italy, Russia and Spain.⁸ ĉe ex-
perience premium evolved more homogeneously across countries, as it increased
in all countries apart from Sweden⁹ and the magnitude of the increase was more
similar compared to the skill premium. Furthermore the gender premium fell sub-
stantially in all countries.
Additionally, it is of major importance to calculate the college premium within
diﬀerent groupsof experience and theexperiencepremiumwithindiﬀerent groups
of education. By doing this we will be able to tackle unanswered questions such as
theoneposedbyHornstein et al. (2005): ''why the experiencepremium increased
signiėcantly within the group of high school graduates, while it has remained con-
stantwithin the groupof college graduates''. A studybyWeinberg (2004) contrasts
the diﬀerence between the increasing experience premium for unskilled workers
and its Ěat paĨern for the skilled ones (see Figure 2). Orwe can shedmore light on
the observation stressed byCard andDiNardo (2002b) that: ''while the rise in the
average wage gap between college and high-school workers has been extensively
numerous labor economists and macroeconomists focusing on labor income distribution.
⁸ĉat iswhy if all countries are pooled together, asTrostel et al. (2002)do for 28 countries for
the period 1985 to 1995, the return to education does not seem to follow and increasing paĨern.
⁹Notice however that the data they use for Sweden refer to aěer-tax earnings.
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documented, the fact that the increases have been very diﬀerent for diﬀerent age
groups is less well known''. According to the laĨer the rise in the skill premium
for men is much larger among young workers and this paĨern does not appear
to be well explained by either the rising-skill-price or computer-use/skill comple-
mentarity versions of SBTC.'' Existing literature, fromKatz andMurphy (1992) to
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) suggests that the paĨern of the skill premium is in-
creasing for all experience groups; however the increase is larger for inexperienced
workers (see Figure 1).
One other crucial aspect of the evolution of wage inequality, is the fall in min-
imum wages (see Figure 3 (appendix B) for the paĨern of real minimum wages
as presented in Card and DiNardo (2002a)). Many studies propose a paĨern of
movements to the opposite direction betweenminimumwages and wage inequal-
ity. Lee (1999), Card and DiNardo (2002a), and Teulings (2003) propose that
the fall in real minimum wage is responsible for the rising wage inequality in the
US and ėnd that the real minimum wage explains approximately a ƭƤ% of varia-
tions on wage inequality. Figure 4 (appendix B) illustrates the result by Card and
DiNardo (2002a) that there is a systematic relationship between real minimum
wages and overall wage inequality. Additionally, comparing Figure 2 with Figures
3 and 4 one can observe that the decline in minimum wages is closely linked with
both the rise of the experience premium within the group of high school gradu-
ates and the rise in overall wage inequality in the US.¹⁰ Autor et al. (2010) show
¹⁰Machin (1997), and Machin et al. (2003) ėnd similar results for the UK. DiNardo and
Lemieux (1997) suggest that in the US the minimum wage fell signiėcantly inducing a rise in
wage inequality, while in Canada the more moderate decrease in the minimum wage caused a
smaller increase in wage inequality.
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that a decline in minimum wages increases wage inequality not only at the lower
tail of the wage distribution but also at wage percentiles where the minimum is
non-binding, which implies spillovers.
3.5.2 Mŏ EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ AńńŇŃĵķļ: Dĵŉĵ, MĹŉļŃĸ ĵłĸ RĹňŊŀŉň
Formyown calculations I use theMarchCurrent Population Survey, which is con-
structed in order to be representative of the US labor market. I use individual data
for realweekly earnings from1963 to2008. Mysample is comprisedofwhitemales
aged 16 to 64 that work full-time, full-year (FTFY), deėned as 35-plus hours per
week 40-plus weeks per year and who are not self employed. I also exclude those
who have a real weekly wage below 67 US dollars (measured in 1982 US dollars).
As in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the real wage series are deĚated using Personal
Consumption Expenditure DeĚator (PCE), which shows a lower rate of inĚation
compared to the more commonly used Consumer Price Index (CPI). However,
before documenting the wage inequality paĨerns derived from my own calcula-
tions, I ėrst highlight the most related ėndings from previous empirical studies.
Figure 10a shows that both the skill and the experiencepremium increase signif-
icantly. ĉe skill premium increased signiėcantly from 1980's onwards, climbing
from 1.45 to almost 2 in the year 2008, which means that on average the wage of
the skilled worker is almost twice as much as the wage of the unskilled one. While
the experience premium increased throughout the entire period of our study, from
1.3 in 1963 to 1.7 in 2008. Figure 11a highlights that the skill premium increases
for both the experienced and the inexperienced workers but the rise is greater for
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the laĨer. Figure 12a shows the evolution of the experience premium within the
group of skilled and unskilled workers. ĉis graph indicates that a large part of the
increase in the experience premium can be aĨributed to the inĚuence of the group
of unskilled workers. Figures 10b, 11b and 12b indicate the composition of work-
ers for each education-experience group. Table 1 highlights the increase in the
coeﬃcients on education and experience from mincerian log-wage regressions in
1963 and 2008. Figure 13 shows the fall in theUS federal real minimumwage that
occurred during the period 1978-1989. However, the mere fall of the minimum
wage cannot account for the rise in wage inequality, which extends to a longer pe-
riod. Figure 14 shows that unskilled-inexperienced wages declined sharply dur-
ing the period 1970-1997, whenmost of the increase in wage inequality occurred.
Figure 15 shows that from 1970 to 1997 there was amirror image between the real
wage of unskilled-inexperiencedworkers and the experience premiumonlywithin
unskilled, as well as the skill premium both within experienced and inexperienced
workers.
3.5.3 TļĹ FĵŀŀĽłĻ UłňĿĽŀŀĹĸ-IłĹŎńĹŇĽĹłķĹĸWĵĻĹň
Figure14 indicates that indeedwages forunskilled-inexperiencedworkersdeclined
signiėcantly from1970 to 1997. Over this period therewas a decline of 20% in real
wages for this group of workers. However, before examining this we should recon-
sider carefully the theoretical part and check whether it is appropriate to extend
it empirically. In order to perform the comparative statics exercise, all other pa-
rameters must remain constant when credit constraints relax. ĉe most relevant
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parameter in our case relates to the the tuition cost, which I treat as constant. Is
this an empirically plausible assumption? Figure 20 indicates precisely this. In
particular, Hoxby (2000) suggests that tuition fees for the average college have re-
mained constant in real term between 1970 and 1996. Most of the rise in tuition
fees on average, over this period has been drivenmainly from increases at the very
expensive colleges, while for most of the colleges there was actually no change in
real terms. ĉismeans that during the period 1970-1996we can perform the com-
parative statics analysis.
Figure 15displays the inverse of thiswage on the right vertical axis of each graph
and the correspondingwage ratio on the right one. ĉe inverse of the real wage for
unskilled-inexperiencedworkers almost coincides with both the skill premium for
experienced and inexperienced workers, as well as with the experience premium
for unskilled workers (see the north-west, north-east and south-east graphs re-
spectively). ĉis happens during the period 1970-1997 (indicated by the two ver-
tical lines on each graph), when that credit constraints have relaxed and college
aĨendance have increased, as my study suggests (see ėgures 8 and 9). ĉe north-
west graph illustrates that the inverse of the real wage for unskilled inexperienced
workers and the skill premium for experienced workers co-move but the rise in
this wage premium is smaller compared to the skill premium for inexperienced
ones. ĉis fact is in line with my theoretical results. On the contrary, the south-
west graph shows that the experience premium for skilled workers does not relate
with the real wages for unskilled inexperienced workers and has a constant trend
from 1970 to 1997. All these facts are in perfect harmony with the predictions of
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my theoretical model, since the increase in the three out of the four wage premia
occurs due to the decline of the wage for unskilled inexperienced workers, while
there is no increase in the experience premium for skilled workers.
So far we have examined the evolution of the wage ratios in relation to the de-
clining denominator (unskilled-inexperienced real wages). However, for a beĨer
understanding we also have to examine the nominators (skilled or experienced
real wages). Figure 16 indicates that the increase in the skill premium for inexpe-
rienced workers coincides mainly with the decline in the denominator (unskilled-
inexperienced wages), while the nominator (unskilled-inexperienced wages) re-
mains constant. Figure 17 indicates that the increase in the experience premium
forunskilledworkers again coincideswith thedecline in thedenominator (unskilled-
inexperiencedwages),while thenominator (unskilled-experiencedwages) remains
Ěat. In ėgure 18 the picture is not as clear as in the previous ones. However, even
from this ėgure one can observe that if something, changes in the skill premium
coincide with changes in the denominator (unskilled-experienced wages). While
ėgure 19 clearly indicates that the experience premium for skill workers do not
change as both the nominator (skilled-experienced wages) and the denominator
(skilled-inexperienced wages) remain almost constant.
ĉis evidence suggests that the explanation exposed in the theoretical part ėnds
strong empirical support from theCPS and it is worthy examining some of its pre-
dictions more formally. In particular, the most important result of the theoretical
model is the decline in ability for the average unskilled-inexperienced worker. I
explore empirically precisely this prediction of the theoretical model.
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3.6 Ał EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ TĹňŉ ĺŃŇ ŉļĹ AŀŀŃķĵŉĽŃł Ńĺ AĶĽŀĽŉŏ Ľł Eĸ-
ŊķĵŉĽŃł
I argue that from1970 till 1997 credit constraints have become less severe and this
has sorted ability beĨer in education groups. In particular, the credit constrained
but able individual who could not acquire education in the past, can access the
credit markets nowadays and go to school. In the model this leads to a decline in
the ability of the average uneducated worker.¹¹
ĉe National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) for the years 1979 and
1997 include a measure of cognitive ability, the Arm Forces Qualiėcation Test
(AFQT).Using this I canėndwhether ability is beĨer allocated in educationgroups
nowadays or in the past. In particular, I am interested in examining whether the
relatively uneducated group is comprised of less able individuals nowadays, as this
is a crucial prediction ofmy theoreticalmodel. However, AFQT is not comparable
between the two surveys because individuals have taken this test at diﬀerent ages
and the test format has changed from a paper and pencil test in 1979 to a com-
puter administered test format in 1997. Segall (1997) adjusts for the diﬀerences
between the paper and pencil and the computer administered test, while Altonji,
Bharadwaj and Lange (2012) control also for diﬀerences in ages and create an ad-
justed AFQT that is appropriate for comparisons between the two surveys. I am
using this adjusted AFQT for my empirical analysis.
Initially, I am examining the correlation of AFQT with education for diﬀerent
¹¹In this empirical section I use several education thresholds for the less educated groups and
the results are robust.
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groups. ĉe results are displayed in Chart 1 (Appendix B). All charts show a de-
cline in ability for both the more and the less educated groups. However, the co-
eﬃcients from regressions with years of education as the dependent variable and
control variables that include abilitymeasurewithAFQT, among others give a bet-
ter picture. In particular, I estimate the following regression:
Educi = c+ αƥAFQTi+ αƦFemalei+ αƧBlacki+ αƨHispanici+ αƩYearOfBirthi+ εi
(3.19)
Education is measured in years of schooling, for ability I use the adjusted AFQT,
other control variables include dummies for gender and race. I estimate this re-
gression for diﬀerent education categories, such as for those who have at least high
school complete to those who have not (educ > ƥƥ vs educ < ƥƦ), those who have
at least some college education to those who have not (educ > ƥƦ vs educ < ƥƧ),
as well as for those who have at least completed college to those who have not
(educ > ƥƩ vs educ < ƥƪ).
Chart 2 andTables 2 and 3 indicate that the coeﬃcient onAFQTdeclinesmuch
more for the less educatedworkers compared to themore educatedones. Inpartic-
ular, the diﬀerence between the more and the less educated workers is statistically
signiėcant and this is displayed in Chart 3. However, the most important result is
depicted in Chart 3, which illustrates that ability declines signiėcantly only for the
less educatedworkers. ĉe results are robust for all education groups. ĉis analysis
provides strong empirical support to my theoretical model. ĉe main prediction
of my model is that the average uneducated worker becomes less able, the wages
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for unskilled-inexperienced workers decline signiėcantly and this boosts wage in-
equality. ĉe analysis based on the NSLY tests precisely this hypothesis and pro-
vides further empirical support to the theoretical analysis.
3.6.1 Ał AŀŉĹŇłĵŉĽŋĹ TĹňŉ ŊňĽłĻ IłĸĽŋĽĸŊĵŀ FĽŎĹĸ EĺĺĹķŉň
An alternative test for the same hypothesis could be based on the data from the
Panel Studyof IncomeDynamics (PSID).ĉemain advantageof this dataset com-
pared to theNLSY is that it is a panel of data, which allowsus touse individual ėxed
eﬀects. ĉemain idea is to use individual ėxed eﬀects and interpret themas ability.
More formally, we take the following model:
logwageit = ai + cƥExpit + cƦExp
Ʀ
it + cƧTenit + cƨTen
Ʀ
it + Controls+ εit (3.20)
ĉen we can take the point estimates of the individual ėxed eﬀects, treat them as
proxy for ability and use it as a control variable for the equation below:
Educi = cƤ + cƥAbilityi + cƦIncomei + Controls+ εi (3.21)
However, this test has the following problems compared to the one I performed
based on NLSY. First, the NLSY provide directly a measure of ability, while the
PSID does not. Second, I ėnd it problematic to take the individual ėxed eﬀect
residuals from wage regressions, interpret them as ability and then ėnd the ef-
fect of changes in this measure of ability (which is actually residuals from wages)
on education and wages themselves. Last but not least, Eeckhout and Kircher's
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(2011) recent insightful contribution in the sorting literature, suggests that such
ėxed eﬀects are not appropriate for recovering information related to the type of
economic agents.
3.7 QŊĵłŉĽŉĵŉĽŋĹ AłĵŀŏňĽň - TĹķļłŃŀŃĻŏ ŋň SŃŇŉĽłĻ
3.7.1 TļĹMŃĸĹŀ ŌĽŉļ DĽŁĽłĽňļĽłĻ RĹŉŊŇłň ŉŃ LĵĶŃŇ
Consider the same economy with the only alteration that diﬀerent education ex-
perience combinations enter as imperfect substitutes in the production function,
which exhibits diminishing returns to labor inputs. ĉere exist ėve such groups:
unskilled inexperienced, unskilled with some experience, unskilled experienced,
skilled-inexperienced and skilled-experienced workers¹². For each one of these
groups labor exhibits diminishing returns, while production is linear (constant re-
turns to scale) to composite labor, which is the only input. Formally:
Y = ZL (3.22)
Labor is divided into the ėve groups as follows and takes the form of constant
elasticity of substitution:
L = [(AU;ILU;I)σ + (AU;ELU;E)σ + (AU;EELU;EE)σ + (AS;ILS;I)σ + (AS;ELS;E)σ ]ƥ=σ
(3.23)
¹²ĉe average unskilledworker can acquiremore experience as he enters the labormarket ear-
lier compared to the skilled-educated worker, who sacriėces some years of potential experience
for schooling.
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ĉemarginal product of labor for each of these ėve groups is given below:
@Y
@LU;I
= ZAσU;ILσ ƥU;I  wuƥ (3.24)
@Y
@LU;E
= ZAσU;ELσ ƥU;E  wu;PƦ (3.25)
@Y
@LU;EE
= ZAσU;EELσ ƥU;EE  wu;PƧ (3.26)
@Y
@LS;I
= ZAσS;ILσ ƥS;I  wsƦ = qh (3.27)
@Y
@LS;E
= ZAσS;ELσ ƥS;E  wsƧ(= qh) (3.28)
ForunskilledworkersLearning-By-Doing(LBD) implies that: AU;EE  AU;E 
AU;I; with equality if there is noLBD.ĉesameholds for the skilledworkersAS;E 
AS;I.
Now by taking the log of the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) we can
ėnd the log of the wage premia, such as the skill and the experience premium. For
instance the skill premium for inexperienced workers is the following:
lnMRTSI;UI = ln
wsƦ
wuƥ
= σ ln AS;I
AU;I
+ (ƥ  σ) ln LU;I
LS;I
(3.29)
According to the so called Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC) approach, the
71
skill premium increased because technology favors the relatively more educated
workers. More technically this requires that the fraction AS;I=AU;I increases. ĉis
directed technical change increases the demand for skills and so the relative wages
for this group of workers, despite the rise in the relative supply of skills LS;I=LU;I,
which tends to decrease the relative wages for skilled workers. My signalingmodel
with credit constraints and private employer learning suggests a complementary
explanation based on the composition of unobservables, such as ability or produc-
tivity to groups of observables, such as education-experience categories. In partic-
ular, I show that the relaxation of ėnancial constraints allowed talented individuals
to acquire higher education and leave the uneducated pool, decreased unskilled-
inexperienced wages and this in turn boosted wage inequality. ĉis explanation is
consistent with US data indicating that the rise in the skill and the experience pre-
mium coincides with the fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same
time skilled or experienced wages remain constant. ĉis means that as the supply
of skilled workers LS;I increases in equation (27), the productivity of the average
unskilled worker AU;I falls, as the most talented among the previously credit con-
strained individuals are those who abandon the uneducated pool ėrst.¹³
Mymodel focuses on supply factors and provides an explanation of the paĨern
of risingwage inequality in theUS, such as the increase in the skill premiumdespite
the growing supply of skills, among other facts. However, this framework can be
combined with the SBTC approach, which is based primarily on the demand side
¹³ĉis does not mean that extended education ėnance can generate this process indeėnitely.
Aěer a pointmore educational opportunitiesmight also allow less able individuals to acquire ed-
ucation, which can happen only if schooling becomes less challenging. In themodel this requires
a decline in the eﬀort cost of education.
72
and in particular on the role of technology-skill complementarities.
3.7.2 QŊĵłŉĽŉĵŉĽŋĹAłĵŀŏňĽňŌĽŉļSĿĽŀŀ-BĽĵňĹĸTĹķļłĽķĵŀCļĵłĻĹOłŀŏ
It is interesting to calculate howmuch of the rise in the skill premium for inexperi-
enced workers can be aĨributed to the SBTC approach and howmuch to my the-
ory. In order to do this I ėrst calibrate equation (27) for the SBTC approach only,
as in Katz and Murphy (1992).¹⁴ According to data on wages from the CPS, dur-
ing the period 1970-1997 the skill premium for inexperienced workers increased
from 1.5 to 1.9, while the relative supply of skills increased from 0.3 to 0.5 (see ėg-
ures 11a and 11b). Additionally, for an elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled inexperienced workers ƥ=(ƥ   σ) of size 1.5, we can derive a value
for σ equal to 1/3. ĉe value 1.5 of the elasticity of substitution comes from the
level of the skill premium for inexperienced workers in 1970. Dividing both parts
of the equation below, with equation (27), we can ėnd the intensity of the SBTC
between 1970 and 1997.
ln ƥ:ƭ
ƥ:Ʃ
wsƦ
wuƥ
=
ƥ
Ƨ
ln γ AS;I
AU;I
+
Ʀ
Ƨ
ln Ƥ:Ƨ
Ƥ:Ʃ
LU;I
LS;I
(3.30)
ĉe parameter γ captures the intensity of SBTC between 1970 and 1997. Solv-
ing for the above using (8) yields a γ equal to 5.65, which implies a skill-biased
technical change in excess of ƦƩ% per year.
¹⁴See also Violante (2008).
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3.7.3 QŊĵłŉĽŉĵŉĽŋĹAłĵŀŏňĽňŌĽŉļSĿĽŀŀ-BĽĵňĹĸTĹķļłĽķĵŀCļĵłĻĹĵłĸ
SŃŇŉĽłĻ
Now I incorporate my theory to the SBTC approach and equation (8) becomes:
ln ƥ:ƭ
ƥ:Ʃ
wsƦ
wuƥ
=
ƥ
Ƨ

ln δ AS;I
AU;I
+ ln γ0 AS;I
AU;I

+
Ʀ
Ƨ
ln Ƥ:Ƨ
Ƥ:Ʃ
LU;I
LS;I
(3.31)
δ captures the sorting eﬀect, which leads to a decline in the productivity of the
average unskilled-inexperienced worker. Notice that in the ėrst term inside the
parenthesis, the productivity of the skilled-inexperienced labor AS;I is held con-
stant, while in the second term the productivity of unskilled-inexperienced work-
ers is kept constant respectively. ĉis allows us to separate the eﬀect of sorting
compared to other technological ''improvements''. In real 2008 dollars, unskilled-
inexperienced wages have declined from 675 dollars per week in 1970 to 540 dol-
lars in 1997, implying that δ equals 1.25.
ln ƥ:ƭ
ƥ:Ʃ
wsƦ
wuƥ
=
ƥ
Ƨ

ln ƥ:ƦƩAS;I
AU;I
+ ln γ0 AS;I
AU;I

+
Ʀ
Ƨ
ln Ƥ:Ƨ
Ƥ:Ʃ
LU;I
LS;I
(3.32)
ĉeparameter γ0 captures the intensity of SBTCbetween1970and1997aěer con-
trolling for the sorting eﬀect. Solving for the above using (27) yields a γ0 equal to
4.52, which implies a skill-biased technical change of less than ƦƤ% per year. ĉis
indicates that over the period 1970-1997, one ėěh of the change on the demand
(the diﬀerence between the ƦƩ% and the ƦƤ%), which in the literature is aĨributed
to the skill-bias of technology, can be a supply eﬀect based on the composition of
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ability to diﬀerent education-experience groups. ĉe data seem to support this ex-
planation, as indeed wages for unskilled-inexperienced workers have declined sig-
niėcantly, whilewages for skilled-inexperiencedworkers have remained Ěat. Addi-
tionally, technological change implies ''improvements'', which means an increase
in AS;I, which at the same time should have forced real wages for this group to in-
crease. However, this is not what the data from the CPS suggest, if productivity
is indeed in line with wages. On the contrary, there is strong evidence for falling
wages for unskilled-inexperienced workers, which can be partially explained by a
decline in the average productivity for this group AU;I. Importantly, from 1970 to
1997 inequality measured by the skill and the experience premium seems to in-
crease mainly due to the decline of unskilled-inexperienced wages. Figures 16 to
19 highlight precisely this observation. One can see the signiėcant eﬀect of the
decline in unskilled-inexperienced wages, especially on ėgures 16 and 17. ĉis
suggests that we should be cautious in interpreting the residual change in produc-
tivity, denoted with γ0 as driven by skill-biased technological change.
To illustrate the ėt of my sorting theory with the data, I re-write the key equa-
tion, indicating with arrows the changes according to mymodel and the CPS.
ln w
s
Ʀ
wuƥ #
= σ

ln AS;I
AU;I # + ln γ
0 AS;I
AU;I

+ (ƥ  σ) ln LU;I
LS;I " (3.33)
Similarly one can derive expressions and perform quantitative analysis for the
other groups, such as the skill premium for experienced workers or the experience
premium for skill and unskilled workers.
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3.8 RŃĶŊňŉłĹňň
Wage Decline for Unskilled Inexperienced Workers. ĉis study aĨempts to
explain the four facts I mentioned at the end of the second chapter. However,
not only I managed to provide a microfounded explanation of these four facts but
also I have shown that all these changes occur due the decline of the wage of un-
skilled and inexperienced labor. ĉis last observation was a result of the theoret-
ical model, which seems to ėnd strong empirical support from US labor market
evidence. In fact Figure 14 (appendix B) shows that indeed the wages of unskilled
inexperiencedworkers have declined signiėcantly from1970 to 1997. Exactly dur-
ing the same period (1970-1997) we observe a large increase at the skill premium
for inexperienced workers, a more moderate increase at the skill premium for ex-
perienced workers and an increase at the experience premium only for unskilled
workers, while the experience premiumof skilledworkers have remained constant
(see ėgure 15). ĉis is precisely what my theoretical model predicts. Importantly,
in both my theory and the real data from the CPS the increase in the three out of
the four wage premia that I examine, occurs when the wage of unskilled inexperi-
enced labor falls.
Human Capital. In general, education is not a mere signal. College aĨendance
apart from indicatingunobservable ability, it also increases laborproductivity. Even
though this is a crucial point, I abstract from it in order to keep the framework
simple and make clear the aspect of education that drives the results of this paper,
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which is nothing else but signaling. However, the model can be extended with the
inclusion of human capital. Under somemild assumptions, such as the increase in
ability from education investments for old workers to be lower than for the young
ones, the main results can still hold. I feel that this extension might be a more
realistic approach, which is feasible within the current framework and may be a
promising project for future research.
Learning-by-Doing. It is also true that workers learn by doing and this increases
their productivity. However, the model I presented above abstracts also from this
element, since labor productivity is given for each agent for their entire life (ql for
the low types and qh for the high types). I can easily extend the model and aug-
ment it with learning-by-doing by introducing a law of motion for labor produc-
tivity: qjt+ƥ = λtq
j
t, where t = ƥ; Ʀ , j = fl; hg and λƥ > λƦ > ƥ. ĉis would give a
concave proėle for wages over the life-cycle, aﬀecting the level of wage premia but
not the changes in response to a relaxation of credit constraints. ĉis implies that
propositions 3 and 4 would be valid even if we augment the model with learning-
by-doing.
MinimumWages. In themodel presented above, without human capital, it seems
that theminimumwage is not the initial wage of the unskilledworker with zero ex-
periencewuƥ but the wage of the low type unskilled worker with one year of experi-
ence, which iswu;lƦ . However, this is neither empirically plausible normymodel ar-
gues that wages can also decrease with experience. On the contrary, I propose that
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there can be a negative return to experience due to employer learning for workers
with low ability.
In general, economists observe that wages increase over the life-cycle generat-
ing a concave wage proėle. However, this can be the total eﬀect of two separate
eﬀects moving to opposite directions and diﬀering in magnitude. Under asym-
metric information competitive ėrms oﬀer to the entire pool of unskilled workers
a wage that equals their marginal productivity, say wuƥ . ĉen for the uneducated
workers there is a dual inĚuence on their wages. On one hand, there is a return to
experience due to employee learning (learning-by-doing), which is always positive.
While on the other hand, there is a return to experience due to employer learning,
which is positive for the uneducated high types and negative for the uneducated
low types. Now consider an unskilled low type. ĉe ėrst period competitive ėrms
oﬀer a wage wuƥ , even for the low types who produce only ql that is lower than his
wage ql < wuƥ . Firms do this, since, if they oﬀer a lower wage, other ėrms will
aĨract all the low and high types. But notice that all ėrms wish to employ uned-
ucated high types in the ėrst period, since during the second period they derive
a proėt by those workers. During the second period there are two eﬀects on the
wage of a low type: a negative return to experience due to employer learning and a
positive return to experience due to learning-by-doing. If the laĨer outweighs the
former, it is not clear to an economist whether the ėrst eﬀect even exists or not,
since the observed paĨern is just an increase in wages over the life-cycle. How-
ever, there are empirical papers addressing this issue and they ėnd strong evidence
for employer learning. In particular they ėnd a causal eﬀect of ability test scores
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and wages (see Arcidiacono et al. (2010)). My theory proposes that the concave
proėle of wages over the life-cycle, conceals diﬀerent eﬀects moving potentially to
opposite directions. ĉe table below illustrates these eﬀects.
Decomposition of Wage Dynamics 
                                                              
                                                             Signaling Approach                Human Capital Approach 
Return to Education due to:                     1) signaling                           2) human capital 
     High School graduates                                 0                                                  0 
     College graduates                                         +    (<25%)                                   + + +    (>75%)
Return to Experience due to:             1) employer learning                2) employee learning 
     High School graduates                            +   or   –                                            +
     College graduates                                        0                                                  +
Note: The table above shows the evolution of wages that correspond to different education and experience
levels. The wage growth is decomposed in four components. The return to education (here college 
education) is dual due to: 1) signaling and 2) human capital. According to Lange (2007) the signaling value 
of education represents at the most a 25% of the total value of education, while the remaining 75% is a 
human capital effect. He also suggests that the signaling value of education depends on the speed of 
employer learning. The return to experience is also twofold due to: 1) employer learning and 2) employee 
learning. According to Arcidiacono, et. al. (2010) the returns to 10 years of experience due employer 
learning are significant and approximately of the same size as the return to a college degree due to 
signaling. The return to employer learning is positive for the high types and negative for the low types. 
While employee learning or learning-by-doing increases for both college and high school graduates. Observe 
that both the signaling and the employer learning components of wage growth link with informational 
asymmetries (signaling approach), while the human capital and the employee learning ones link with the 
productivity increasing aspect of education (human capital approach).  
I propose that since 1970's credit constraints relaxed signiėcantly (see Figure 8)
and rendered education more easily accessible. ĉis in turn increased the college
continuation rates (see Figure 9) and leě only few agents unskilled. Since educa-
tional opportunity increased, ėrms consider that the unskilled worker is less likely
to be talentedbut credit constrained; while it ismore likely to be less talented. ĉat
is why the initial wage for unskilled and inexperienced labor declined and gener-
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ated an increase in the experience premium within unskilled workers; as well as,
increased the skill premium within both the group of experienced and inexperi-
enced employees.
Notice however, that this endogenously determined initial wage can decrease
only if the legislation allows it, by seĨing the exogenous real minimum wage at a
lower level, which is the case for the US labor market (see Figure 3). During the
period 1981 to 1989 US authorities allowed this decline in the federal minimum
wage by being passive and keeping the nominal minimumwage at 3.35 dollars per
hour despite the rising inĚation. ĉis generates a mirror image between the de-
clining real minimum wage and the rising labor income inequality (see Figure 4),
a paĨern that ėnds strong empirical support in many countries and especially in
the US.
ĉerefore, theminimumwage is indeed the initial wage of the unskilled worker
wuƥ and in fact the reduction of this minimumwage generates higher wage inequal-
ity. ĉis is a very important theoretical result that ėnds strong empirical support.
My ėnding is in line with Card and DiNardo (2002a), who support that the early
rise in inequality may have been due to rapid technological change, however they
suggest that the increase in the early 1980's is primarily aĨributed to the fall in the
real value of the minimumwage.
However, themere fall of theminimumwage, which occurred from 1978-1989,
cannot account for the rise in wage inequality, which extends to a longer period.
Figure 14 shows that unskilled-inexperienced wages declined sharply during the
period 1970-1997, when most of the increase in wage inequality occurred. ĉe
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theoreticalmodel suggests that the falling unskilled-inexperiencedwages drive the
four empirical facts that this study explains. Figure 15 shows that this is the case,
since from1970 to1997 therewas amirror imagebetween the realwageofunskilled-
inexperienced workers and the experience premium only within unskilled, as well
as the skill premium both within experienced and inexperienced workers.
Student Loans, Tuition Cost and College Expansion. My theoretical model
suggests that since 1970's credit constraints relaxed signiėcantly. ĉis is in har-
monywithUS evidence on the increasing volume of loans as a percentage of GDP
(see Figure 8). I argue that the easing of ėnancial constraints, rendered education
more easily accessible despite the rising tuition cost. According to Hoxby (2000)
this is indeed the case, as increases in average tuition cost are driven by increases
at themost expensive four-year private universities, while themajority of students
aĨend colleges that have the lowest average price and where inĚation adjusted tu-
ition growth has been modest. She argues that for half of the US universities the
tuition cost in real terms remained unchanged from 1970 to 1996, which is the
period that I am primarily interested (see Figure 20). ĉe relaxation of credit con-
straints increased educational opportunities and college continuation rates (see
Figure 9) and leě only few agents unskilled. Since educational opportunity in-
creased, ėrms consider that the unskilled worker is less likely to be talented but
credit constrained; while it is more likely to be less talented. ĉat is why the ini-
tial wage for unskilled-inexperienced labor declined and generated an increase in
the experience premium within unskilled workers; as well as, increased the skill
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premium within both the group of experienced and inexperienced employees.
3.9 DĽňķŊňňĽŃł
ĉis paper provides an explanation for the growing over the past four decades. In
particular, it shows the reason why the experience premium rises only within the
group of less-educated workers while it remains Ěat for the relatively more edu-
cated ones, a fact that the skill-biased technical change literature fails to explain.
ĉis is mainly a result of the declining unskilled-inexperienced wages that induce
an increase in wage inequality, a paĨern that ėnds strong empirical support in the
US over the period 1970-1997. ĉe theory presented here is also consistent with
the sharp rise in skill premium for inexperiencedworkers and itsmoderate increase
for the experiencedones. Notice that the skill premium increases despite the grow-
ing supply of skilled labor. ĉe driving factor of these changes in wage inequality is
the decline in unskilled inexperienced wages, a paĨern that ėnds strong empirical
support by US data.
ĉe next chapter introduces gender-speciėc credit constraints and apart from
explaining thegrowingeducationandexperiencepremium, it also explains thenar-
rowing genderwage gap. In particular, it provides a justiėcation of all three of these
paĨerns in a uniėed theoretical framework, which is consistent with evidence.
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''Equality before the law and material equality are therefore
not only diﬀerent but are in conĚict with each other; and we
can achieve either one or the other, but not both at the same
time''.
Friedrich August Hayek,
ĉe Road to Serfdom (1944).
4
Sorting Inequality with Gender-Speciėc
Credit Constraints
Abstract: ĉree of the most well-documented facts of US wage inequality concern the
rise in the education premium, the increase in the experience premium and the narrow-
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ing gender wage gap. Even though there exist explanations for some of these paĨerns
alone, there is no uniėed justiėcation for all three at the same time. I show that a model
of signaling with credit constraints and private employer learning explains the combina-
tion of these facts. Before the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, access to credit was
much costlier for women, while recently the cost of borrowing has becomemore similar
for the two genders. ĉis asymmetric relaxation of ėnancial frictions generated a beĨer
sorting of ability in education, mainly by allowing poor but able women to acquire ed-
ucation. ĉe model is consistent with the increase in the supply of skills especially for
women, the fall in wages for unskilled-inexperienced labor, as well as with the fact that
the education premium increases more for inexperienced workers and the experience
premium increases only for the low-educated ones. ĉis theory suggests that virtuous
reforms that equalize borrowing opportunities for men and women, decrease inequality
between genders, however they also increase inequality within gender by boosting the
wage gap between diﬀerent education and experience groups for both sexes.
4.1 IłŉŇŃĸŊķŉĽŃł
IłLĵĶŃŇMĵŇĿĹŉňMŃŇĹEŅŊĵŀOńńŃŇŉŊłĽŉĽĹň canbebeneėcial for some in-
dividuals but at the same time theymight harmothers. In chapter 3 it is shown that
reforms equalizing educational opportunities can in fact increase wage inequality,
as a result of beĨer sorting.¹ ĉis study shows that more equal credit access for
¹Hendel et al. (2005) derive the same result, while this idea dates back to Hayek (1944,
1948).
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women and men, increases the college and the experience wage premium, while
at the same time it decreases the gender wage gap. ĉis paĨern is consistent with
some of the most well-documented recent developments in the US labor market,
such as the increase in the supply of skills especially for women and the decline of
wages for unskilled and inexperienced workers, among others.
A recent paper by Alesina, LoĨi and Mistrulli (2013) provides evidence sup-
porting that women pay more for credit compared to men. ĉey also show that
this is not a result of riskier behavior among women but mainly a consequence
of gender discrimination, while they aĨribute this to the lack of ''social capital''.²
However, an earlier study by Bellucci, Borisov and Zazzaro (2010) suggests that
indeed women face tighter access to credit, as they face a lower probability of re-
ceiving a loan when they apply for it, even though they do not pay higher rates
of interest. Although both studies focus on Italian enterprizes, the main empiri-
cal ėnding in Alesina et al. (2013) is employed here to build a theoretical model
with gender-speciėc credit constraints in education that explains changes in the
US wage structure. In particular, I suggest that even American women in the past
used to pay more for credit than men, while recently the cost of borrowing has
becomemore similar for the two genders.
Even thoughnowadays it is unlikely females to face tighter access to credit, in the
past US lenders discriminated against some groups of borrowers and particularly
against women. According to Ladd (1998), prior to the passage of the 1974 Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, banks oěen had explicit policies to treat women less fa-
²In their seĨing social capital and diﬀerent levels of trust refer to the degree of security be-
tween lenders and borrowers.
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vorably than men. She argues that in the 1970's, lenders oěen discounted a wife's
income by 50 percent or more when evaluating mortgage applications and banks
were more likely to discount the wife's income if she was of child-bearing age or if
the family included pre-school children. When the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974 prohibited sex-based classiėcations and income discounting, the change
seems to have had a dramatic eﬀect on bank policies toward women (Schafer and
Ladd (1981), and Ladd (1982)).
ĉis evidence is conėrmed by several recent studies, suggesting that aěer the
EqualCreditOpportunityActof 1974 there is liĨleornoevidenceof gender-based
discrimination in the US credit markets. For instance, more recent studies, such
as Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) ėnd no impact of borrower's gender on the
probability of loan approval and on the interest rate charged on granted loans, even
aěer controlling for borrower's race and a large set of ėrm and loan characteristics.
However, in contrast to their earlier ėndings, in a subsequent study Cavalluzzo et
al. (2002) support that there still exists some form of gender-based discrimina-
tion but only in concentrated credit markets compared to the competitive ones.
BlanchĚower et al. (2003) fail to establish the existence of gender-based discrim-
ination in US credit markets aěer accounting for the borrower's past credit his-
tory and other risk characteristics. Cole andMehran (2009) report that once con-
trolled for ėrm and owner characteristics, females are neither signiėcantly more
discouraged fromapplying for credit normore likely to be denied credit when they
apply. ĉese studies seem to provide further evidence on the changing paĨern of
credit constraints for American women, which have become more similar for the
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two genders recently, compared to the 1960's or the 1970's.
Additionally, this chapter also links to international studies focusing on gen-
der and credit, as well as to the vast literature on discrimination. Experimental
evidence from developing countries suggests that discrimination against women
in borrowing is widespread there even nowadays, as it used to be in the US in the
past. For instance, DeMel et al. (2009) show thatwomen are stillmore credit con-
strained in Sri Lanka. Also, this paper connections to the economics of discrimi-
nation, initiated by Becker (1957) and with earlier studies providing evidence of
racial discrimination in ėnancing, such as Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) and
BlanchĚower et al. (2003), among others.
However, most of these studies focus on ėnancing constraints faced by enter-
prizes. Instead of focusing on credit constraints in physical capital investments,my
approach concentrates on human capital and in particular in the funding of higher
education. Several studies, such as Hansen (1983) and Fenske et al. (2000), sug-
gest that the extension of student aid over the 1970's and 1980's primarily had an
impact on American women. ĉis chapter provides a link between the increase in
student aid for higher education and thedeclining cost of borrowing forwomen. In
particular, I suggest that in the past, credit constraints have been much tighter for
women, while from 1970's onwards they have become more similar for men and
women. Even though it is true that in most cases parents apply directly for their
children education loans, I feel that the approach of gender-speciėc credit con-
straints captures some important aspects of the change in the US ėnancial struc-
ture, while at the same time several needy students apply individually either for
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bank loans or for government student aid programs.
Apart formthe relevanceofmy studywith the evidenceongender-speciėc credit
constraints, this paper also contributes to a vast and rapidly growing literature
on changes asymmetric for the two gender that generate a decline in gender in-
equality. Among the main explanations one would ėnd the declining inĚuence of
all the following: women work less hours (Becker (1985), and Aguiar and Hurst
(2007));mendominatewell-paidoccupations - pink collar (Blau andKahn(2000));
women are less Ěexible in the workplace - motherhood penalty vs men's marriage
premium (Albanesi andOliveĨi (2007), andAĨanasio et al. (2005)); stereotypes
and discrimination (Becker (1957)); diﬀerent perceptions, negotiation strategies
and risk aĨitudes (Babcock and Laschever (2003)); technology favors skills that
usually men possess (Goldin (1990)); selection - able women are out of the labor
force (Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008)); women do not employ their compara-
tive advantage in brains compared to muscles (Galor and Weil (1996)); divorces
mainly favor men (Fernandez and Wong (2011)); low female labor force partic-
ipation (Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011), Lee and Wolpin (2010), and Heathcote,
StoresleĨen, and Violante (2010)).
Two important observations: ėrst, some of the above still contribute to gender
wage diﬀerences but these studies suggest that their inĚuence has declined; sec-
ond, even aěer controlling for all of themmost studies still ėnd that approximately
20% remains unexplained. A commonpoint among these papers andmy approach
is that I provide a framework tomodel changes that beneėtmainly women. My ex-
planation is based on the increase in the net value of higher education for women
88
relative tomen, which comes from the asymmetric relaxation of credit constraints
that makes the cost of borrowing similar for males and females.
ĉis chapter suggests that gender discrimination in borrowing, aﬀects school-
ing and this explain the falling gender pay gap, while at the same time the educa-
tion and the experience premium increase. In this sense, it links more toMulligan
and Rubinstein (2008). A distinguishing feature of my paper is that apart from
explaining the puzzling coexistence of falling inequality between genders and the
rising inequality within gender - as they do, my theory accounts also for two in-
equality paĨerns within diﬀerent education and experience groups that hold for
both genders: the fact that the education premium increases more for inexperi-
encedworkers, while the experience premium increases only for the low-educated
ones.
ĉe contribution of this study is the provision of a uniėed theoretical explana-
tion for the following combination of facts:
• Fact 1:ĉe gender wage gap declines.
• Fact 2:ĉe skill premium increases despite the rising supply of skills espe-
cially for women.
• Fact 3:ĉe experience premium rises signiėcantly.
• Fact 4: ĉe skill premium grows sharply for inexperienced workers and
only moderately for the experienced ones.
• Fact 5: ĉere is a puzzling coexistence of rising experience premium for
unskilled workers and a Ěat paĨern for the skilled ones.
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ĉepaper sheds light on theunintendedconsequencesof reforms that equalizeop-
portunities. In particular, a policy implication suggests that equalizing borrowing
opportunities for men and women decreases inequality between genders but in-
creases inequality bothwithin gender and alsobetweendiﬀerent education andex-
perience groups. ĉe results are based on the beĨer sorting of ability into diﬀerent
education groups and are consistentwith a sharpdecline in unskilled-inexperience
wages for both men and women.
4.2 SŉŏŀĽŐĹĸ Fĵķŉň
According to Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri and Violante (2010) the three most impor-
tant cross-sectional facts for macroeconomists are the increase on the skill pre-
mium, the rise on the experience premium and the narrowing gender wage gap
(for theUS see ėgures 22-24). ĉey provide evidence for several developed coun-
tries. Most of the recent studies examine the evolution of the education and the
gender wage premium, while experience seems to be an understudied aspect of
rising wage inequality. Importantly, there is no uniėed theoretical explanation of
all three facts at the same time. ĉis is the gap in the literature that this chapter
aĨempts to ėll.
I use the March Current Population Survey, which is constructed to be repre-
sent the US labor market. I use individual data for real weekly earnings from 1963
to 2008. My sample is comprised of white males and females aged 16 to 64 that
work full-time, full-year (FTFY), deėned as 35-plus hours per week 40-plus weeks
per year andwho are not self employed. I also exclude thosewhohave a realweekly
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wage below 67 US dollars (measured in 1982 US dollars). As in Acemoglu and
Autor (2011), the real wage series are deĚated using Personal Consumption Ex-
penditure DeĚator (PCE), which shows a lower rate of inĚation compared to the
more commonly used Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Figure 22 shows the rise in the education premium for both men and women.
ĉe increase in the experience premium for both genders is illustrated in ėgure
23, while 24 depicts the narrowing gender wage gap. Even for well-established
paĨerns, such as the growing education premium, the fact that it increases much
more for inexperienced workers - both men and women - is much less oěen re-
ported, if not entirely absent from most studies. Figure 1 show that for both men
andwomen the education premium rises sharply for inexperiencedworkers, while
it increasesonlymoderately for the experiencedones. Similarly ėgure25 illustrates
that from early 1960's till 2000 the experience premium increases only for low-
educated workers, while it remains constant for the highly educated ones. ĉese
happenover aperiodof increasing college completion rates forbothgenders. How-
ever, the increase was sharp for women andmuchmoremoderate formen (see ėg-
ure 27). I suggest that the relaxation of credit constraints - as depicted in ėgure 8,
allowed able student to acquire college education and leě only few talented work-
ers in the pool of low-education and low-experience. ĉis means that on average
productivity for this group has fallen andwages have declined, as shown in picture
14 for men and picture 26 for women.
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4.3 TļĹ EķŃłŃŁŏ
My theoretical model extends the economy of chapter 3. In particular, it builds on
Hendel et al. (2005), which combines Spence's (1973) signaling approach with
credit constraints as in Galor and Zeira (1993) to explain how the skill premium
increases when credit constraints become less severe. Two distinguishing features
of my model are the following: ėrst, I introduce private employer learning to ex-
plain the rise in the experience premium; second, I depart from the symmetry of
credit constraints for men and women of Galor and Zeira (1993) and I allow for
diﬀerences in borrowing for the two genders. ĉis new feature in the literature,
related to the gender-speciėcity of credit constraints and its asymmetric relaxation, is
inspired by new empirical ėndings and is employed here to account for the nar-
rowing gender wage gap, while at the same time the education and the experience
premium increase.
If I repeat the exercise of chapter 3 for each gender separately, from proposi-
tions 3 and 4 we can ėnd that for both men and women the skill premium in-
creasesmore for inexperienced compared to experiencedworkers, while the expe-
rience premium increases only for low-educated workers. ĉis chapter develops
the framework that combines these two ėndings with a narrowing gender wage
gap.
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4.3.1 PŇĹŀĽŁĽłĵŇĽĹň
Agents. In this economy people live for three periods, time is discrete, and the
total population is comprised of heterogenous agents. A fraction f of them are fe-
males and the remaining aremales, denoted bym. For eachworker ig, the subscript
g = ff;mg denotes the gender, while for simplicity I assume that the population
is equally divided in males and females. In the mass one of male population there
are two types of workers, a proportion π of high ability workers and a proportion
ƥ   π of low ability ones. Every potential worker has a private information on his
productivity. Each worker produces qj where j = fl; hg. In particular, the low
ability worker produces ql units of output and the high ability one produces qh
units (qh > ql). In addition to diﬀering in ability, workers also vary in their ini-
tial wealth endowments. ĉe same applies for the mass one of female population.
ĉerefore, apart from the diﬀerent gender there are two sources of heterogeneity
stemming from innate ability and initial wealth diﬀerences.
ĉecost of education is dual. ĉere is a direct ėxed tuition costT and an indirect
diﬀerentiated eﬀort cost depending on agent type. ĉe eﬀort cost is higher for the
low ability worker kl > kh. ĉis notion of indirect cost captures Spence's (1973)
idea that education is more challenging for less able students. Spence measures
the added eﬀort required for low ability students to graduate from college as an
argument of the utility function. For simplicity, here this ismodeled as amonetary
cost.³ Without loss of generality, it is also assumed that kh = Ƥ. At the top of these
³One can think of this cost as paying additional tutors, purchasing supplemental materials or
simply time costs.
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two costs there is also an opportunity cost, stemming from the fact that schooling
is full-time and students cannot work.
Every period people can either work or go to school. Although, some ėnd it
proėtable to acquire education when young or in the second period of their lives,
no rational agent prefers to invest in education at the ėnal periodof her life, as there
is no period to get the return of her investment in schooling. If they acquire educa-
tionwhen young, theywork as skilled for the second and third period of their lives,
for a wage wsƦ and wsƧ, respectively. If they do not acquire education they work for
the unskilled wage wuƥ during the ėrst period of their lives but during the second
period of their lives some of them can acquire education using the unskilled wage
they have accumulated during the ėrst period. Notice that education is a mere
signal, since it does not aﬀect worker's productivity.⁴ Even though there are diﬀer-
ences between low and high types, there are no gender diﬀerences apart from the
the cost of borrowing.
Firms. Firms compete over workers and set wage prices (Bertrand competition).
Firms are interested in productivity, which is unobservable in the ėrst period. ĉat
is why they observe workers' actions, they form beliefs and they set the ėrst period
wages accordingly. In the second period, ėrms privately learn the productivity of
their employees. We require to have at least two ėrms in order wages to equal the
perfectly competitive ones. ĉeproduction function is linear that implies constant
⁴ĉis paper examines only the signalling approach of wage determination. However, this
approach can be combined with the human capital one and generate more realistic results.
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returns to scale in labor, which is the only input. Formally:
Yt(Qt) = AQt: (4.1)
Where A is the productivity parameter and Q denotes eﬃcient units of labor. In
particular, the low ability agent is endowed with ql units of eﬃcient labor, while
the high type is endowed with qh, where qh > ql. Firms pick a mixture of wages
that maximizes their proėts.
Timing. Timing is essential in this three-period model. In particular, during the
ėrst period of their lives some agents go to school, while others work aěer signing
one-period contracts. At the end of this period they receive the wages agreed and
they invest all theirwealth inone-periodbonds, for an interest rate rl. Someborrow
at a higher interest rate rb in order to access education (we discuss later in detail
that the borrowing interest rate is higher for women rbf > rbm). All loans are payed
back at the last period of agents lives. So, loans taken either in period one or in
period two, are reimbursed at the end of period three.
During the second period of their lives ėrms privately observe workers' pro-
ductivity. Uneducated workers decide whether to go to school when old or not,
using the unskilled wagewuƥ that they earned. At the end of the second period they
receive the payment agreed and they invest their wealth in bonds. For the third pe-
riod employees provide their labor, receive the corresponding wages, repay their
loans, gather all their lifetime earnings and they consume them.
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Firms privately observeworkers' productivity during the ėrst period of employ-
ment and at the second period they know the types of their employees. However,
this is private information for each ėrm. So, if workers want to be employed by
other ėrms as skilled, they still have to acquire education in the second period of
their lives. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the return to school invest-
ments can be higher compared to the return of bond investments. ĉus, agents
ėrst examine the possibility of investing in education and then in bonds.
Market Failures.ĉe functioning of the economy is aﬀected by threemarket fail-
ures: 1) asymmetric information, 2) credit market imperfections and 3) private em-
ployer learning. Primarily in this seĨing agents have a private information about
their ability type. Individuals of high ability try to signal their type to their poten-
tial employers. In fact, they invest in education to get their diplomas, and they use
them to signal their type, which leads to a higher wage. Notice that education is a
costly signal just as in Spence (1973) and the total cost diﬀers depending on agents'
type.
ĉe second market failure relates to the functioning of ėnancial markets. I in-
troduce credit market imperfections following Galor and Zeira (1993). So, there
is a lending interest rate rl and a borrowing interest rate rbg and it is true that rbg > rl.
Where the subscript on the borrowing rate denotes the gender of the individual.
However, I extend this type of credit market imperfections with the inclusion of
gender-speciėcity. In particular, the borrowing interest rate is larger for women
compared to men rbf > rbm, leading precisely to this expression rbf > rbm > rl. ĉe
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diﬀerence between the two borrowing rates takes the form of gender discrimina-
tion in credit. ĉe diﬀerence between each borrowing rate and the lending rate of
interest stems from the possibility of defaulting, which requires the adoption of a
costly screening technology by the lenders. In this partial equilibrium small-open-
economy framework, rl equals the world interest rate. ĉat is why the relatively
less wealthy agents cannot invest in education. ĉis assumption combined with
the asymmetries of information render ėrms incapable of distinguishing the low-
type from the credit constrained high type, when there is no educational signal.
Employers privately observe worker performance and aěer a period of employ-
ment the ability-type of each worker is revealed. ĉat is why aěer a period of em-
ployment only the incumbent ėrm knows the type of its workers. ĉe potential
competitors still face informational frictions about the type of potential newwork-
ers. All the above is common knowledge.
Additionally, the use of a set ofmild assumptions facilitates the analysis, without
harming the robustness of the theoretical framework. In particular, it is assumed
that ėrms are price takers and the production function is subject to constant re-
turns to scale. Price taking behavior and ėrm homogeneity is assumed in order to
focus our analysis on imperfections related to information asymmetries and credit
constraints. However, extending the present framework with the inclusion of het-
erogenous ėrms and diﬀerentiated jobs / tasks might generate some interesting
implications. Constant returns guarantee that the marginal productivity does not
depend on the number of workers, facilitating the analysis of wage determination.
A further assumption relates to the indivisible nature of educational investments,
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which implies that education is a discrete binary choice taking either the value 0
or 1.
Lifetime Earnings. All agents maximize their lifetime earnings, given their type
and initial wealth. In this economy there are four classes of agents, diﬀering on
their type and initial wealth. Below I calculate the lifetime earnings for each social
class. Consistentwith the notation earlier, j stands for the type and g for the gender
of individual i.
Self-FundedYoungStudents:ĉeėrst group is comprisedby thosewhohaveenough
initial wealth to acquire education when young without borrowing. ĉose with
wealth bi  T+ kj get a lifetime income of:
yA = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(bi   T  kj) + (ƥ+ rl)wsƦ + wsƧ: (4.2)
Young Borrowers: Workers with wealth bi 2 [b;T+ kj) can access proėtably the
credit markets. However, since they cannot cover the total cost of education, seek
for external funding, borrow and get lifetime income of:
yB = (ƥ+ rbg)Ʀ(bi   T  kj) + (ƥ+ rl)wsƦ + wsƧ: (4.3)
For women yB is smaller as the borrowing interest rate rbg is larger for them (rbf >
rbm). At the second period, workers who have worked as unskilled know that their
employment ėrms have observed their productivity. So they can bargain with
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their employment ėrms, using the possibility of acquiring educationwhen old and
working for other ėrms. Notice that evenworkerswith zero initialwealth can cover
the tuition cost using their ėrst-period labor income, provided that wuƥ > T. ĉe
crucial point is whether they are talented enough to cover the eﬀort cost kj.
Self-funded Old Students: Workers with bi 2 [T+ kj   (ƥ+ rl)wuƥ ; b) can acquire
education using their own funds aěer a period of employment and get:
yC = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + bi)  (ƥ+ rl)(T+ kj) + wsƧ: (4.4)
ĉere can also be old borrowers but as you will see later on, we exclude this case.
Uneducated: Agentswith initial wealth bi < T+kj (ƥ+rl)wuƥ remain uneducated.
ĉese agents get a lifetime income of:
yD = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + bi) + (ƥ+ rl)wu;jƦ + wu;jƧ : (4.5)
Assumptions. I propose the following four assumptions that aﬀect the actions
of the agents. At this stage these assumptions depend also on the endogenous
variables but once I solve the game (under these assumptions), I will be able to
substitute out the endogenous variables and check whether the equilibrium that I
guessed can be veriėed. In particular, I make the following assumptions:
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Assumption 1: ĉe eﬀort cost for the low type is suﬃciently high.
kl >
(ƥ+ rl)(wsƦ   wu;lƦ ) + wsƧ   wu;lƧ   (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + T)
(ƥ+ rl)Ʀ
(4.6)
ĉe intuition is simple: for low types the eﬀort cost kl is high enough that no low
type (not even the richest) ėnds it proėtable to invest in education. Assumption 1
comes from the following comparison of lifetime earnings yD > yA.
Assumption 2: Even the lowest possible unskilled wage can cover the tuition cost.
T  (ƥ+ rl)ql (4.7)
ĉe logic is straightforward: all the initially constrainedhigh types cango to school
when old, since even the minimum unskilled wage (wuƥ (min) = ql) is enough to
cover the tuition cost (which is the only cost for high types; recall kh = Ƥ). No
agent borrows when old.
Assumption 3: Credit constraints make it proėtable only for some high types to
borrow and go to school when young.
bi  (ƥ+ r
b
g)
ƦT+ (ƥ+ rl)wuƥ   (ƥ+ rl)(wsƦ + T)
(ƥ+ rbg)Ʀ   (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ
 b (4.8)
ĉeabove inequality is an incentive compatibility constraint, stating thatonly some
relatively wealthy agents ėnd it proėtable to borrow and go to school when young.
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Assumption 3 comes from the following comparison of lifetime earnings yB  yC,
which implies that high types with wealth bi  b prefer to go to school when
young rather than when old. Notice that this assumption yB  yC covers also the
case yA  yC, which means that high types prefer to go early to school rather than
late. ĉis is true since CMI imply that it is always beĨer to be self-funded rather
than borrow yA > yB.
Assumption 4: High types prefer to separate themselves from the pool of unedu-
cated workers even when old.
T <
wsƧ   wu;PƧ + (ƥ+ rl)wu;PƦ
ƥ+ rl
(4.9)
Intuitively, for the high types who do not go to school when young (those with
initial wealth bi < b), it is always beĨer to separate themselves from the pool
of uneducated workers, by going to school when old. Assumption 4 comes from
yC > yDpooling. Where yDpooling is:
yD = (ƥ+ rl)Ʀ(wuƥ + bi) + (ƥ+ rl)wu;PƦ + wu;PƧ and wuƥ = wu;PƦ = wu;PƧ .
Discussion of theAssumptions.What do these assumptions imply for ėrm's be-
liefs? Assumption 1 implies that all educated workers are high types. So, ėrms
know that a signal of schooling can be sent only by high types. ĉis implies in turn
that the skilledwage equals the productivity of the high typewsƦ = wsƧ = ws
0
Ƨ = qh.
Assumption 4 implies that those who do not go to school even at period t = Ʀ are
low types. So, the unskilledwages of the second and the third period equal the pro-
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ductivity of the low type wuƦ = wuƧ = ql. Also notice that no agent goes to school
at the third period of his life, as he will not be able get the return of educational
investments. ĉat is why the only wage that we have to determine is wuƥ .
Unambiguously there are oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs. However, I can elimi-
nate them as unreasonable using the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987).
In particular, ėrm's belief that ''an educated worker can be of low type'' is unrea-
sonable, since assumption 1 guarantees that all low types are beĨer oﬀ without
education. Accordingly, the belief that ''in period two, high types try to ėnd a job
to other ėrms for a higher wage'' can be eliminated. ĉe logic is simple, prior try-
ing to work for other ėrms, high types consider the following two reactions, in a
forward-looking sense: ėrst, in the absence of education other ėrms still cannot
separate low from high types (private employer learning); second, if uneducated
high types try to ėnd a job to other ėrms for a higher wage, then all low types have
an incentive to mimic them, this generates the pooled wage for all the uneducated
workerswu;PƦ = wu;PƧ = wuƥ . But fromassumption 4we know that high types prefer
to separate themselves from low types by going to school when old rather than re-
maining to the pool of all uneducated workers and by assumption 2 we know that
they can do this.
Gender Discrimination. In this model there is no gender discrimination in the
labor market. ĉis implies that ėrms cannot oﬀer a diﬀerent wage to males or fe-
males with the same observable characteristics. However, the fact that the cost of
borrowing depends on gender is a source of pre-labor market gender discrimina-
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tion. ĉis distinction between pre-labor market and labor market discrimination
is important, as it allows us to adopt the framework used in chapter 3 and derive
some interesting results only by changing the nature of credit credit constraints
from symmetric for the two sexes to gender-speciėc credit constraints.
4.3.2 EŅŊĽŀĽĶŇĽŊŁ
I employ the following equilibrium concept
Deėnition 3 A Perfect Bayesian signaling equilibrium is deėned as:
1. choices of education in the ėrst period and second period, based on skills and ini-
tial wealth bequests: Aƥ (qj; bi) 2 fschool; notg, AƦ(qj; bi) 2 fschool; notg;
2. beliefs by ėrms about worker type in the ėrst period of employment given their
education level Bƥ(jjAƥ), 8 Aƥfschool; notg and BƦ(jjAƦ), 8 AƦfschool; notg;
3. and equilibrium wages: wu;mƥ ;wu;fƥ ;wu;hƦ ;wu;lƦ ;wsƦ;wu;hƧ ;wu;lƧ and wsƧ.
Such that:
1. workers maximize their lifetime earnings,
2. ėrms maximize their proėts,
3. labor markets clear.
ĉe only diﬀerence of this compared to deėnition 2 from chapter 3 is that here
there are two diﬀerent unskilled inexperienced wages: wu;mƥ is the male wage and
wu;fƥ is the femalewage. Notice that if the distribution of ability is the same for both
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genders and the only diﬀerence is that women face tighter credit constraints, then
unskilled inexperienced wages for women should be higher wu;mƥ < wu;fƥ , as ėrms
expect to ėndmore female rough diamonds. We can ėnd all thewages above, apart
from these two wages. However, proposition 1 from chapter 3 states that there
exists at least one stable equilibrium wage for unskilled inexperienced workers.
ĉerefore, both wages wu;mƥ and wu;fƥ exist in equilibrium and for the entire society
there exists at one stable equilibrium.
To avoid this diﬀerence between the unskilled-inexperienced wages for men
and women, we introduce a further assumption that ėrms cannot discriminate on
the basis of gender. ĉat is why they oﬀer the same wage wuƥ to both male and fe-
male unskilled inexperienced workers. ĉis wage equals the product of the num-
ber of males and females times the corresponding wage over the sum of unskilled
inexperienced workers: wuƥ = [Nu;mƥ wu;mƥ + Nu;fƥ wu;fƥ ]=[Nu;mƥ + Nu;fƥ ]. I call this no
gender discrimination in wages assumption. ĉerefore, there is no gender discrimi-
nation in labor markets but there is gender discrimination in the credit markets.
4.4 CŃŁńĵŇĵŉĽŋĹ SŉĵŉĽķň
I examine the interaction between credit frictions, the skill, the experience and
the gender premium. ĉe source of variation comes form the fact that credit con-
straints have relaxed asymmetrically for the two genders. In fact, the relative dis-
tance between lending rate and the borrowing interest rate for females have de-
clined by more compared to the one between the lending and the borrowing in-
terest rate for males. More formally the degree of gender-speciėcity of credit con-
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straints, which is deėned as γ below, declines.
Deėnition 4 ĉeDegree of Gender-Speėcity of Credit Constraints
γ =
rbf   rl
rbm   rl
(4.10)
For γ larger than 1 borrowing is costlier for females. ĉe easiest way to keep the
essence of the asymmetric relaxation of gender-speciėc credit constraints, is to al-
low for a decline only at the borrowing interest rate for females rbf . Keep in mind
that the lending rate rl is constant and equal to the world interest rate. A more
complex way to generate the same variation is to allow the borrowing interest rate
for females rbf to fall by more compared to the one for males rbm. In both of these
cases there is a decline in γ.
In a stable equilibrium, easing credit constraints more for women compared to
men, shiěs the supply curve forunskilled labor to the leě. With anormaldownward-
sloping demand curve, such a shiě leads to a rise in the wage since demand would
exceed supply. However, in our model the demand curve is upward-sloping, so
the wage decreases to restore the equilibrium. Importantly, policies that equalize
educational opportunity between genders, such as lowering rbf , actually increase
wage inequality for diﬀerent education and experience groups. I summarize this
logic in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 In any stable equilibrium,when credit constraints relaxmore forwomen
compared to men, the skill premium rises sharply for inexperienced workers and only
moderately for the experienced ones, for both genders.
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Proof See Appendix A.
ĉe proposition above is in harmony with Figure 1 that shows a larger increase
of the skill premium for inexperienced workers. Notice that this is true for both
males and females. ĉis means that less severe credit constraints would increase
skill premium and wage inequality. Additionally, if the borrowing interest rate de-
creases, fewer high ability workers will remain uneducated, generating a decrease
on the initial wage of the unskilled and inexperienced worker, which in turn leads
to an increase on the experience premium. Notice that the rise in the experience
premium is generated due to inĚuence of the unskilled workers and not the skilled
ones. More formally the proposition below holds:
Proposition 8 In any stable equilibrium,when credit constraints relaxmore forwomen
compared to men, the experience premium rises only for unskilled workers, while it re-
mains constant for the skilled ones, for both genders.
Proof See Appendix A.
ĉe ėndings summarized in Proposition 8 ėnd strong empirical support by US
evidence. Figure 25 shows that for women the experience premium increases only
for low-educated workers.
Additionally, the asymmetric relaxation of credit constraints, which makes the
cost of borrowingmore similar for men and women, reduces the gender wage gap.
ĉe simplest way to highlight this result is to consider that credit constraints relax
only forwomen. In this case, aěer the relaxation of credit constraintsmorewomen
will acquire education by paying a lower borrowing interest rate, which increases
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their lifetime earnings.
Proposition 9 When credit constraints relax more for women compared to men, the
gender wage gap narrows for both experienced and inexperienced workers.
Proof See Appendix A.
ĉis is mainly a result of the a change in the composition, as more women get the
higher skilled wages (wsƦ = wsƧ = qh), while there is no diﬀerence in the level of
wages formenandwomen. Males and females get the samewage for all skill andex-
perience groups both before and aěer the change in the credit markets. However,
aěer the relaxation of credit constraints more women go to school. ĉis means
that the gap between the average wage of women and the average wage of men
narrows. It is straight forward that the same holds when credit constraints relax
for both men and women but for women they relax more. ĉe result ėnds strong
empirical support (see ėgure 24).
4.5 DĽňķŊňňĽŃł
In this section, I distinguish the contribution of this paper compared to two rele-
vant studies. In the model we have seen that credit constraints are more binding
for women rbf > rbm > rl. In the signaling model of Hendel et al (2005), credit
constraints are symmetric for the two genders rbf = rbm  rb. Now consider that rl
is ėxed and equals the world interest rate. In their seĨing a decline the borrowing
interest rate rb increases the skill premium.
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In chapter 3, I introduce private employer learning in Hendel et al. (2005) and
a fall in rb increases both the skill and the experience premium. At the same time,
the relaxation of credit constraints rises the skill premiummore for inexperienced
compared to experienced workers and increases the experience premium only for
unskilled workers.
In themodel I develop here, a decline in rbf and rbm of the same size generates the
same results as in chapter 3 for both genders. However, an asymmetric relaxation
of credit constraints, which is a decline in the diﬀerence between the borrowing
interest rates for women andmen rbf   rbm leads also to a decline in the gender wage
gap, together with a rise in the skill and the experience premium. By doing so it
reconciles some puzzling and contradictory facts of wage inequality. At the same
time, this theory explains why college aĨendance increased more for women, as
well as why wages decline for men and women with low levels of education and
low levels of experience.
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"ĉe natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it
unjust that persons are born into society at some particular
position. ĉese are simply natural facts. What is just and
unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts."
John Rawls,
Aĉeory of Justice (1971).
5
Conclusion
TļĽň SŉŊĸŏ PŇŃŋĽĸĹň ĵł EŎńŀĵłĵŉĽŃł for the rise in wage inequality over the
past four decades. In particular, it shows the reason why the experience premium
rises onlywithin the groupof less-educatedworkerswhile it remains Ěat for the rel-
atively more educated ones, a fact that the skill-biased technical change literature
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fails to explain. ĉis is mainly a result of the declining unskilled-inexperienced
wages that induce an increase in wage inequality, a paĨern that ėnds strong em-
pirical support in the US over the period 1970-1997. ĉe theory presented here
justiėes the sharp rise in skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moder-
ate increase for the experienced ones, while it is also consistent with a narrowing
gender wage gap and a growing supply of skills especially for women.
ĉe economic intuition behind most of the results of this paper is that with-
out knowing the productivity of each person, competitive ėrms form beliefs for
their potential employees and pay them according to their expected productivity.
Forty years ago, it was more likely for the unskilled worker to be highly produc-
tive, since credit constraintsweremore severe andmany able individuals could not
acquire education. However, credit frictions relaxed signiėcantly since then and
educational opportunities have become more equal. ĉat is why being unskilled
today is perceived by ėrms as an even worse signal for worker's ability compared
to the past. ĉis is the reason why during the 1970's ėrms used to oﬀer higher
initial wages to unskilled-inexperienced workers. From 1970 till 1997 real wages
for unskilled-inexperienced labor have declined sharply. However, if aěer the re-
laxation of credit constraints an unskilled employee proves that he is highly pro-
ductive but he just happened to be one of the few credit constrained workers, he
receives a much higher return with experience, compared to what he would have
got in 1970. ĉismeans that not only formal signals, such as college degrees, gener-
ate wage beneėts for workers; but also informal learning, such as private employer
learning, can crucial for worker's wage growth. ĉis is how the experience pre-
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mium increased. In the same spirit, the skill premium has also widen, in response
to the fall in wages for the unskilled-inexperienced worker.
An interesting policy implication relates to the potential conĚict between in-
equality of opportunity and wage inequality and suggests that policy makers must
clearly distinguish the one from the other. ĉe fact that more equal opportunities
can increase substantial economic inequality and lead to less equal opportunities
for the future generations, highlights the vicious circle associated with the nature
of inequality and the complexity of policy-making.
ĉe other policy implication associates with the minimum wage policy. In the
presence of multiple equilibria, selection is essential, as one of the candidate equi-
libria might lead to a high level of wage inequality, while one other can generate
lower wage inequality. I show that through minimum wages governments can af-
fect unskilled-inexperienced wages and therefore the level of equilibriumwage in-
equality.
My results are based on three realistic elements of the labor market: educa-
tion signaling, credit constraints and private employer learning. ĉemain ėndings
are robust even when the pure signaling model augments with human capital and
learning-by-doing. ĉis study also provides amicrofounded game-theoretical rea-
soning for important macroeconomic facts related to rising wage inequality. My
approach focuses mainly on the role of labor supply, while the growing literature
on skill-biased technical change focuses on the demand side. ĉat is why I feel that
these two approachesmust be seen as complementary rather than substitutionary.
ĉe combination of these two theories is feasible and it seems to provide a beĨer
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understanding of labor income distribution, compared to each approach alone.
Lastly, both theoretical andempirical research isneededon the interactionamong
asymmetric information, credit constraints and employer learning, and their ef-
fects on the functioning of the macroeconomy and labor markets. Future theoret-
ical studies should extend the current framework with the inclusion of parental
bequests and derive useful implications about intergenerational justice and the
distribution of income. In addition to this, further empirical studies are crucial
for testing formally the validity of the mechanism proposed here. In both cases,
it seems that there is a promising avenue for research on the relationship between
labormarket inequalities andmarket failures, such as ėnancial frictions and incom-
plete information.
Unambiguously, this study does not complete but just initiates an inquiry for
the revelation of the laws that determine the puzzling paĨerns of labor income
distribution. It also highlights the fact that some economic targets cannot be eas-
ily reconciled. As JohnMaynard Keynes (1931) puts it: ''the political problem of
mankind is to combine three things: economic eﬃciency, social justice and indi-
vidual liberty'', all of which are closely interlinked with economic inequality and
equality of opportunity, which are not only hard to compromise but they actually
in conĚict.
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Notation
Exogenous Variables
• π and ƥ  π the fraction of high and low types, respectively.
• qh and ql the productivity of high and low types, respectively.
• qP the expected productivity of agents in the pooling equilibrium.
• kh and kl the eﬀort cost of high and low types, respectively.
• rb and rl the borrowing and the lending interest rate, respectively.
• T the tuition cost.
• P() the cdf of the initial wealth for the high types.
Endogenous Variables
• wuƥ the wage of the uneducated worker in the ėrst.
• wu;PƦ ;wu;PƧ the wage of the uneducated workers when low and high types are
pooled, in the second and third period, respectively.
• wu;hƦ ;wu;hƧ the wage of the uneducated high type worker in the second and
third period, when high types decide to separate themselves from the pool
of uneducated workers and bargain successfully.
• wu;lƦ ;wu;lƧ the wage of the uneducated low type worker in the second and
third period, when there is a separation of types within the pool of uned-
ucated workers.
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• wsƦ;wsƧ the wage of the educated worker in the second and the third period.
• wuƦ = wuƧ : ĉe average wage of the uneducated worker at the second and
third period.
• b the thresholdof initialwealth abovewhich thehigh typesėnd it proėtable
to invest in education when young.
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Appendix A1: Proofs fromChapter 3.
Proof of PROPOSITION 1
For the proof of proposition 1, I proceed in two steps: ėrst I prove existence and
then stability. For existence, I apply Brouwer's Fixed Pointĉeorem, for continuous
functions from a nonempty, convex, compact set to itself. Function f() is indeed
continuous, since P() is continuous by assumption. ĉe function maps from the
set [ql; qP] to [ql; qP] and the set is convex and compact, since the unskilled wage
wuƥ can take any value within this set. So, from Brouwer's Fixed Pointĉeorem an
equilibrium exists.
Now I prove stability. For locally tâtonnement stable equilibria, prices evolve
according to @wuƥ=@t = f(wuƥ )   wuƥ . If I set the derivative of function f() with
respect to wuƥ larger than zero, I ėnd that qh > ql, which is always true and means
that f() is increasing in wuƥ . ĉis implies that when we are in an equilibrium, an
increase in the wage must lead to f(wuƥ )  wuƥ < Ƥ. Now let us take the maximum
possible value forwuƥ , which is qP = ql(ƥ  π)+ qhπ and occurs when P(ujh) = ƥ.
Taking f(wuƥ )   wuƥ < Ƥ for this wage, leads to qh > ql, which is always true.
Accordingly, a decrease from the equilibrium wage leads to f(wuƥ )   wuƥ > Ƥ. If
instead we take the minimum possible value for wuƥ , which is ql and occurs when
P(ujh) = Ƥ, again we conclude that qh > ql, which is always true. Since, for the
lowest pricewuƥ = ql we have f(wuƥ ) wuƥ > Ƥ and for the highest pricewuƥ = qP we
have f(wuƥ ) wuƥ < Ƥ, for a value ofwuƥ in the set (ql; qP)wemust have f(wuƥ ) wuƥ =
Ƥ, whichmeans that there generically exists at least one locally tâtonnement stable
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equilibrium. Notice that the result holds generically, since we cannot exclude the
possibility that the function f() is tangent to the diagonal.
Proof of PROPOSITION 2
Firms have zero proėts at the ėrst period; while, they have positive proėts at the
second and third period. If the proėt for the representative ėrm at period two is
πƦ and if NB is the number credit constrained high types (bargainers) employed
by the representative ėrm, then it is true that πƦ = NB(qh   wu;hƦ ). ĉis is always
positive since wu;hƦ = [qh   (ƥ + rl)T]=(Ʀ + rl). ĉis implies that πƦ = NB(qh +
T)(ƥ + rl)=(Ʀ + rl), which is always positive. Notice also that wu;hƦ = wu;hƧ and
therefore πƦ = πƧ. ĉat is why during the second and third period proėts are
positive for all ėrms.
Proof of PROPOSITION 3
Recall that b # ) P(ujh) # ) wuƥ #. ĉere are two skill premia. ĉe ėrst one
is the skill premium within the group of inexperienced workers, which is denoted
aswsƦ=wuƥ . From (15)we can see that in a stable equilibrium a fall in rb decreases b
andwuƥ . So the ėrst skill premiumwsƦ=wuƥ = qh=wuƥ increases. ĉe second skill pre-
mium is within the group of experienced workers denoted as wsƧ=wuƦ . Notice that
wuƦ stands for the average wage of the uneducated worker regardless of whether he
is a bargainer or not. ĉis wage depends on the number of low types geĨing wage
wu;lƦ = ql and the number of credit constrained high types geĨing wu;hƦ , which is
higher than ql. Observe also that a fall in rb decreases the number of bargainers
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who get the higher wage wu;hƦ and therefore it decreases the average wage of the
uneducated worker with one year of experience wuƦ . Given that wsƧ is constant an
equal to qh, the second skill premium increases as well, when credit frictions re-
lax. So the skill premium for both the inexperienced and the experienced workers
increase as credit frictions relax.
Proof of PROPOSITION 4
ĉere are three experience premia one for the skilled and two for the unskilled
workers. For the skilled workers it is wsƧ=wsƦ = qh=qh = ƥ. For the unskilled
workers the one is computed by comparing their wages of the ėrst and second
period wuƦ=wuƥ and the other by comparing the wages of the second and third pe-
riod wuƧ=wuƦ = ƥ. Notice that the only experience premium that is not constant is
the one of the unskilled workers for the ėrst period of their experience and equals
wuƦ=wuƥ . In a stable equilibrium, less severe credit frictions caused by a decline in
rb decrease b and wuƥ . However, less severe credit frictions decrease wuƦ as well,
since fewer high types will be credit constrained and fewer agents in the unedu-
cated pool will get the higher wage wu;hƦ . So both the nominator and the denom-
inator decrease. Now we compare two experience premia. ĉe one denotes the
experience premium before the relaxation of credit frictions and the other aěer it.
Proposition 4will hold ifExpPremiumbefore < ExpPremiumafter. I suppose that this
inequality does not hold and if I derive a contradiction, then proposition 4 holds.
ExpPremiumbefore  ExpPremiumafter (5.1)
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wuƦ
wuƥ before
 w
u
Ʀ
wuƥ after
(5.2)
NhƦwu;hƦ + NlƦql=[NhƦ + NlƦ]
Nhƥ qh + Nlƥql=[Nhƥ + Nlƥ]
 N
h
Ʀwu;hƦ + NlƦql=[NhƦ + NƦl]
Nhƥ qh + Nlƥql=[Nhƥ + Nlƥ]
(5.3)
Where N denotes the number of agents, the subscript denote the time-period
and the superscript the type of the group. Observe that when the credit frictions
are severe there are more credit constrained high types in the uneducated pool,
which I denote will upper-bar Nhƥ , accordingly aěer the relaxation of credit con-
straints there are fewer, which I denote with lower-barNhƥ . I use the same notation
for period two as well, when the subscript atNh is Ʀ. Notice that: Nhƥ = NhƦ , also
Nhƥ = NhƦ andNlƥ = NlƦ. So the above inequality becomes:
Nhwu;hƦ + Nlql
Nhqh + Nlql
 N
hwu;hƦ + Nlql
Nhqh + Nlql
(5.4)
Aěer some algebra this leads towu;hƦ  qh. But this inequality cannot hold, since it
is always true thatwu;hƦ < qh. ĉis gives us the desirable contradiction. ĉat is why
the experience premium increases only for unskilled workers as credit frictions re-
lax.
Proof of PROPOSITION 5
Given the distribution of initial wealth and skills, for the skill premium we have
the following three cases: (i) in the case of extreme credit market imperfections,
where the possibility of borrowing does not exist, both the probability of being
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uneducated given that you are of high type P(ujh) and the unskilled wage wuƥ are
maximized, so for a given level of skilledwagews = qh, the skill premiumwsƦ = wuƥ
is minimized; (ii) for all the cases of moderate credit market imperfections (the
cases between the extreme form of credit market imperfections and perfect credit
markets), as credit constraints relax or as the wedge rb   rl declines, the skill pre-
mium increases (see propositions 3); (iii) in the case of perfect credit market,
where all agents can borrow any amount they wish, the probability of being un-
educated given that you are of high type P(ujh) is zero and the unskilled wage is
minimized wuƥ = ql, leading to the maximum level of the skill premium that is
qh=ql. ĉerefore, the skill premium increases monotonically as credit constraints
relax.
Accordingly, for the experiencepremium, given thedistributionof initialwealth
and skills, we have the following three cases: (i) in the case of extreme credit mar-
ket imperfections,where thepossibility of borrowingdoesnot exist, both theprob-
ability of beinguneducated given that you are of high typeP(ujh) and the unskilled
wage wuƥ are at their higher level, so for a given level of skilled wage ws = qh and
tuition feesT the experience premium is at its minimum level; (ii) for all the cases
of moderate credit market imperfections (the cases between the extreme form of
creditmarket imperfections and perfect credit markets), as credit constraints relax
or as the wedge rb   rl declines, the experience premium increases (see proposi-
tion 4); (iii) in the case of perfect credit market, where all agents can borrow any
amount they wish, the probability of being uneducated given that you are of high
type P(ujh) is zero so all high ability agents receive an education, that is why no
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agent bargains successfully and so the experience premium equals one, which is its
higher possible level. ĉerefore, the experience premium increases in amonotonic
fashion as credit constraints relax.
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Appendix A2: Proofs fromChapter 4
Proof of PROPOSITION 7
ĉe proposition follows directly from proposition 3, if we repeat the exercise for
each gender.
Proof of PROPOSITION 8
ĉe proposition follows directly from proposition 4, if we repeat the exercise for
each gender.
Proof of PROPOSITION 9
When credit constraints relaxmore for women compared tomen, a larger fraction
of women gets the high skilled wages wsƦ and wsƧ. ĉat is why the gender wage gap
falls for both experienced and inexperiencedworkers, as the compositionof skilled
workers changes and is comprised of more women. ĉis change in the composi-
tion increases the average wage for women. Males and females get the same wage
for all skill and experience groups both before and aěer the change in the credit
markets. However, more women get the high wage aěer the change. ĉis means
that the gap between the averagewage of women and the averagewage ofmen nar-
rows when credit constraints relaxmore for women compared tomen. ĉis is true
for both inexperienced and experienced workers.
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Figure 1: Skill premium within experience groups for males and females. ĉe ėgure
shows that the skill premium increasesmore for inexperienced compared to experienced
workers, for both males and females. Source: Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
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Figure 2: ĉe experience premium for male high school and college graduates (1959-
1997). Solid lines give the wage gap between workers with 25-34 and 0-4 years of ex-
perience. Dashed lines give the wage gap between workers with 10-19 and 0-9 years
of experience, to take into account cohort eﬀects. ĉe regressions adjust for years of
education (among college graduates), marital status, race, urban residence, and region.
Source: Weinberg (2004).
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Figure 3: ĉe falling real minimum wage in US (1973-2000). Source: Card and Di-
Nardo (2002a).
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Figure 4: Wage inequality& realminimumwage inUS (1973-2000). Source: Card and
DiNardo (2002a).
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Figure8: Credit inUS. Federal FamilyEducationLoans as a%ofGDP(USDepartment
of Education and Council of Economic Advisors). Source: Hendel et al. (2005).
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Figure 9: College Continuation rates as a percentage of high school graduates in US
(1959-2009). Source: Postsecondary Education Opportunity.
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Figure 10a: ĉe skill premium is ratio between the average weekly wage of workers
with at least 16 years of schooling, and those with less than 16 years of schooling. ĉe
experience premium is the ratio between the average weekly wage of workers with 20
to 29 years of potential experience, and those with 0 to 9 years of potential experience.
Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
0
.5
1
1.
5
P
op
ul
at
io
n 
 R
at
io
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
realyear
Skill Composition:                 (>=16 yrs of educ) / (<16 yrs of educ)
Experience Composition:      (20-29 yrs of exp) / (0-9 yrs of exp)
Composition of Labor in Education and Experience Groups
Figure10b:ĉecompositionof skills andexperience corresponding toėgure10a. Sam-
ple: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 11a: ĉe skill premium for experienced workers is the same ratio as the skill
premium, with the only diﬀerence that is calculated only for workers with 20 to 29 years
of potential experience. Accordingly, the skill premium for inexperienced workers is the
wage ratio for workers with 0 to 9 years of potential experience. Sample: white males.
Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 11b: ĉe composition of skills for experienced and inexperienced workers cor-
responding to ėgure 11a. Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 12a: ĉe experience premium for skilled workers is the same ratio as the expe-
rience premium, with the only diﬀerence that is calculated for workers with at least 16
years of schooling. Accordingly, the experience premium for unskilled workers is the ex-
perience wage premium for workers with less than 16 years of schooling. Sample: white
males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 12b: ĉe composition of experience for skilled and unskilled workers corre-
sponding to ėgure 12a. Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 13: ĉe time series for the real minimumwage is calculated using the CPI deĚa-
tor in 1996 US dollars. Most of the decline of the real minimum wage occurred during
the period 1978-1989. Comparing with this graph with graph 14, we can see that the
decline of the real wage for the group of unskilled inexperienced workers started almost
a decade earlier, in particular in 1970 and extended for a decade later, more precisely
until 1997. ĉis implies that probably it was not the mere fact that real minimum wage
declined that led to an increase in wage inequality. On the contrary, it should be some-
thing fundamental, such as the decline of the productivity of the average worker at the
group of unskilled inexperienced workers that led to a decrease in the average wage of
that group and this in turn boosted wage inequality. Source: US Department of Labor.
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Figure 14: ĉe time series of the real monthly wage for workers with less than or equal
to 16 years of schooling (less than college graduates) and with less than 9 years of expe-
rience. ĉe sample is for white males only for the US. ĉe two vertical lines highlight
the decline of the unskilled inexperienced wage during the period 1970-1997. Sample:
white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 15: ĉe inverse of the real wage for unskilled inexperienced workers coincides
with the skill premium for experienced, the skill premium for inexperienced and the ex-
perience premium for unskilled workers (see the north-west, north-east and south-east
graphs respectively). ĉis happens from 1970 to 1997 (indicated by the two vertical
lines on each graph), when credit constraints relaxed and college aĨendance increased.
ĉe north-west graph illustrates that the inverse of the real wage for unskilled inexperi-
enced workers and the skill premium for experienced workers co-move but the rise in
this wage premium is smaller comparing to the skill premium for inexperienced ones.
A fact in line with my theoretical results. On the contrary, the south-west graph shows
that the experience premium for skilled workers does not relate with the real wages for
unskilled inexperienced workers and has a constant trend from 1970 to 1997. ĉese
facts are in harmony with my theory, since the increase in the three out of the four wage
premia occurs due to the decline of the wage for unskilled inexperienced workers, while
there is no increase in the experience premium for skilledworkers. Sample: whitemales.
Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure16:ĉeskill premiumfor inexperienced is thewage ratioof skilled-inexperienced
to unskilled-inexperienced workers and increases mainly due to the fall of the denom-
inator. ĉe ėgure highlights that especially during the period 1970-1997, unskilled-
inexperiencedwages have declined signiėcantly, while skilled-inexperiencedwages have
remained constant. Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 17: ĉe experience premium for unskilled workers is the ratio of unskilled-
experienced to unskilled-inexperienced wages and increases mainly due to the fall of
the denominator. ĉe ėgure highlights that especially during the period 1970-1997,
unskilled-inexperienced wages have declined signiėcantly, while unskilled-experienced
wages have remained constant. Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure18:ĉeskill premium for experiencedworkers is the ratio of skilled-experienced
to unskilled-experienced wages and increases slightly. ĉe ėgure highlights that espe-
cially during the period 1970-1997, unskilled-experienced wages (the denominator of
the ratio) have declined slightly, while skilled-experienced wages have remained con-
stant. Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure19:ĉeexperiencepremiumfor skilledworkers is the ratioof skilled-experienced
to skilled-inexperiencedwages and remained constant, as thenominator and thedenom-
inator co-move. Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 20: ĉe tuition fees in real terms have not increasedmuch over the period 1970-
1996 for most of the colleges. ĉe increase in the average tuition cost is mainly driven
by the sharp rise at the top colleges. Source: Hoxby (2000).
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Figure 21: ĉeėgure highlights that unskilled wages have declined signiėcantly mainly
for inexperienced workers. Sample: white males. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 22: Skill premium for males and females. Figure 1 shows that the skill premium
increases for both male and female workers. Source: Heathcote, Perri and Violante
(2010).
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Figure 23: Experience premium for males and females. Figure 2 shows that the expe-
rience premium increases for both male and female workers. Source: Heathcote, Perri
and Violante (2010).
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Figure 24: Gender Wage Gap. Figure 3 shows that the gender wage gap falls. Source:
Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010).
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Figure 25: ĉe experience premium for skilled workers is the same ratio as the expe-
rience premium, with the only diﬀerence that is calculated for workers with at least 16
years of schooling. Accordingly, the experience premium for unskilled workers is the ex-
perience wage premium for workers with less than 16 years of schooling. Sample: white
females. Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure26:ĉetime series of the realmonthlywage forworkerswith less than12years of
schooling (less than high school graduates) andwith less than 9 years of experience. ĉe
sample is forwhite females only for theUS.ĉe two vertical lines highlight the decline of
the unskilled inexperienced wage during the period 1970-1997. Sample: white females.
Source: March CPS 1963-2008.
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Figure 27: People of ages 25-34 with a college degree. ĉe college completion rate in-
creased for both genders. However, the increase was sharp for women and much more
moderate for men. Source: US Census via the Hamilton Project, the Brookings Institu-
tion.
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Appendix B2: Tables andCharts

DependentVariable:log(wage)

1963     2008
 
Constant  5.554*** 5.350***  4.825*** 4.604***
   (0.019) (0.020)  (0.018) (0.018)

Schooling  0.065*** 0.063***  0.126*** 0.122***
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)

Experience  0.009*** 0.036***  0.013*** 0.050***
   (0.0003) (0.001)  (0.0003) (0.001)

Experience^2  0.0006***   0.0009***
     (0.00002)    (0.00002)

AdjRsquared 0.19  0.23   0.30  0.33
Observations 10,762 10,762  29,932 29,932

Note:Thedependentvariableislogweeklyreallaborincomein2008USdollars.Theindependent
variablesareschoolinginyearofcompletededucation,potentialexperiencethatisageminus
educationminus6,andpotentialexperiencesquare.Allsamplesarecomprisedofwhitemalesofage
1664,workingfulltime,fullyear(morethan35hoursperweek,morethan40weeksperyear).
Standarderrorsaredisplayedintheparenthesisandasterisksindicatestatisticalsignificanceatthe
1%(***),5%(**)and10%(*)significancelevel.

Table 1: Comparisons of the standardmincerian log-wage regression for the years 1963
and 2008, with both linear and quadratic terms on potential experience. ĉe sample is
comprised of white males only for the US. Source: March CPS 1963 and 2008.
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
DependentVariable:YearsofEducation

         NLSY1979             NLSY1979  
     
Education>11  Education>12  Education>15    Education<12  Education<13  Education<16

Constant    294.8720***  291.4874***  152.1252***      ?32.2481     ?59.5123   16.6283
     (62.4682)   (81.2068)   (85.0348)     (139.1065)  (60.7767)   (56.5152)

Ability(AFQT)   0.0412***  0.0300***  0.0125***    0.0307***  0.0268***  0.0362***
     (0.0012)   (0.0018)   (0.0023)     (0.0034)   (0.0012)   (0.0010)

Female    0.0245     ?0.1574**     ?0.2390***      ?0.1608   0.0401   0.1504***
     (0.0602)   (0.0777)   (0.0799)     (0.1372)   (0.0595)   (0.0550)

Black    0.8636***  0.2543**     ?0.0203     1.0429***  0.6957***  1.1336***
     (0.0833)   (0.1149)   (0.1298)     (0.1732)   (0.0785)   (0.0716)

Hispanic    0.3770***    ?0.0150   0.1244       ?0.4916***    ?0.3116***  0.1673**
     (0.0957)   (0.1285)   (0.1521)     (0.1817)   (0.0873)   (0.0808)

YearofBirth   0.1472***    ?0.1438***    ?0.0703***    0.0192   0.0341     ?0.0054***
     (0.0319)   (0.0415)   (0.0434)     (0.0710)   (0.0310)   (0.0289)

AdjustedR ?squared  0.30    0.20    0.06      0.21    0.23    0.31
Observations   3,134   1,598   769      575    2,111   2,940

Table 2: Comparisons of regressions on education. Control variables include ability
measured by theAFQT, year of birth anddummyvariables on gender and race. Diﬀerent
columns correspond to diﬀerent education groups. Education is measured in 1987 and
individuals are between 26 and 30 years old. Source: NLSY1979.
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
DependentVariable:YearsofEducation

         NLSY1997             NLSY1997  
     
Education>11  Education>12  Education>15    Education<12  Education<13  Education<16

Constant    16.1295   96.4154***  134.3090***      ?38.4699   42.2241     ?29.1668
     (41.2377)   (43.0594)   (41.1139)     (51.7319)   (38.9129)   (37.3145)

Ability(AFQT)   0.0353***  0.0243***  0.0080***    0.0078***  0.0123***  0.0256***
     (0.0010)   (0.0013)   (0.0013)     (0.0013)   (0.0010)   (0.0009)

Female    0.4730***  0.3505***  0.1265**       ?0.0044   0.0913*   0.2262***
     (0.0582)   (0.0609)   (0.0574)     (0.0717)   (0.0547)   (0.0529)

Black    0.0925     ?0.1459*   0.2066***    0.1967**   0.0696   0.3828***
     (0.0752)   (0.0798)   (0.0802)     (0.0908)   (0.0685)   (0.0655)

Hispanic      ?0.1433*     ?0.2487***  0.0643     0.2160**   0.0247   0.2106***
     (0.0807)   (0.0866)   (0.0878)     (0.0938)   (0.0713)   (0.0696)

YearofBirth     ?0.0039     ?0.0430**     ?0.0600***    0.0237     ?0.0167   0.0188***
     (0.0208)   (0.0217)   (0.0207)     (0.0210)   (0.0196)   (0.0189)

AdjustedR ?squared  0.23    0.14    0.02      0.03    0.07    0.17
Observations   4,804   3,400   1,865     1,100   2,504   4,039

Table 3: Comparisons of regressions on education. Control variables include ability
measured by theAFQT, year of birth anddummyvariables on gender and race. Diﬀerent
columns correspond to diﬀerent education groups. Education is measured in 2010 and
individuals are between 26 and 30 years old. Source: NLSY1997. One can directly
compare the results of table 3 with the ones displayed on table 2 from the NLSY1979,
as the two datasets are adjusted for precise comparisons between the two surveys.
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Correlations of ability and education for diﬀerent education groups
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Chart 1: ĉe charts display the allocation of ability, measured by AFQT, in education
groups. Source: NLSY.
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Coeﬃcients of ability for diﬀerent education groups
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Chart 2: ĉe charts compare the coeﬃcients on ability measured by AFQT from re-
gressions on education. Other control variables apart form AFQT include, year of birth
and dummy variables on gender and race. Diﬀerent columns correspond to diﬀerent
education groups for the NLSY1979 and NLSY1997. Education is measured in 1987
for the NLSY1979 and in 2010 for NLSY1997 and individuals are between 26 and 30
years old. AFQT is adjusted for both the diﬀerence at the time of examination and for
pencil-based exams. Source: NLSY.
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ĉediﬀerence of the coeﬃcients on ability for diﬀerent education groups

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Chart 3: ĉe charts illustrate the diﬀerence on ability between high and low educated
groups for the same year. ĉe dependent variable of the regression is education in years
and the control variables include ability measured by AFQT, year of birth and dummy
variables on gender and race, aswell as interaction terms of all the above-mentioned con-
trol variables with a dummywhich equals one if the individual belongs to one of the high
educated groups (educ>11, educ>12 or educ>15). ĉe charts display the coeﬃcient on
the interaction term of AFQT with the dummy for high education groups. All coeﬃ-
cients are statistically signiėcant even at the ƥ% signiėcance level, apart from the next to
last for the value  Ƥ:ƤƦƧƬ. Columns correspond to diﬀerent education groups for the
NLSY. Education is measured in 1987 for the NLSY1979 and in 2010 for NLSY1997
and individuals are between 26 and 30 years old. AFQT is adjusted for both the diﬀer-
ence at the time of examination and for pencil-based exams. Source: NLSY.
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ĉediﬀerence between the coeﬃcients on ability for 1979&1997

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Chart 4: ĉe charts illustrate the diﬀerence on ability for education groups between
the two NLSY surveys. ĉe dependent variable is education from the two NLSY and
the control variables include ability measured by AFQT, year of birth and dummy vari-
ables on gender and race, as well as interaction terms of all the above-mentioned control
variables with a dummy variable for individuals from the NLSY1997. For each regres-
sion individuals belong to the same education groups. ĉe charts display the coeﬃcient
on the interaction term of AFQT with the dummy for NLSY1997. Asterisks denote
signiėcance levels, three for signiėcance at the ƥ% level, two for the Ʃ% level and one
for the ƥƤ% level. Diﬀerent columns correspond to diﬀerent education groups for the
NLSY1979 & NLSY1997. Education is measured in 1987 for NLSY1979 and in 2010
forNLSY1997, when individuals are between 26 and 30 years old. AFQT is adjusted for
the diﬀerence at the time of examination and for pencil-based exams. Source: NLSY.
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